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Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in swarms, often unnoticed 
in their endless procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. 
Some, for all the benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of 
followers that deplete trials of fairness 
– Roger J. Traynor, Foreword, in The Riddle of Harmless Error, 





The United States Constitution had been in existence for almost two hundred years before 
the Supreme Court decided that some violations of constitutional rights may be too 
insignificant to warrant remedial action. Known as “harmless error,” this statutory 
doctrine allows a court to affirm a conviction when a mere technicality or minor defect 
did not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. The doctrine aims to promote judicial 
efficiency and judgment finality. The Court first applied harmless error to constitutional 
violations by shifting the statutory test away from the error’s effect on substantial rights 
to its impact on the jury’s verdict. Over time, the test evolved even further, now allowing 
a court to disregard the constitutional error when a majority of the justices believe that 
the untainted record evidence shows that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. This sacrifice of 
individual and institutional constitutional protections at the altar of judicial efficiency and 
judgment finality subverts the harmless error doctrine’s purposes and strikes at the core 
of America’s founding ideals. In particular, it allows appellate courts to invade the jury’s 
constitutional role as the finder of fact and guilt, to sidestep their constitutional role to 
review and correct errors and protect the Constitution, and to incentivize government 
actors to commit constitutional violations with little-to-no-ramifications. After 
conducting a comprehensive review of the harmless error doctrine and its development, 
this thesis traces through the many substantive, theoretical, and practical problems with 
the doctrine’s current application. It then proposes that the Constitution and the values 
that it protects should once again be elevated above the harmless error doctrine’s 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The United States Constitution and Bill of Rights had been in existence for almost 
two hundred years before the Court, in Chapman v. California,1 held that “there are some 
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless 
….”2 Thereafter, the Court has applied the harmless error doctrine to all but a select few 
constitutional violations.3 The doctrine originally was created, however, to prevent mere 
technicalities and minutia that did not affect the parties “substantial rights”4 from 
invalidating convictions and requiring unnecessary retrials.5 Its goals include judicial 
efficiency, conviction finality, and pragmatism in reviewing minor trial defects.6 Perhaps 
                                                          
1 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, this thesis focuses on harmless constitutional error in the 
federal direct appeal context. It generally does not discuss non-constitutional errors, state 
court proceedings, habeas corpus review, sentencing cases, or convictions based on plea 
agreements. 
3 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). See also Justin Murray, “A Contextual 
Approach to Harmless Error Review,” Harvard Law Review 130, no. 7 (2017): 1793; the 
instances of courts finding a constitutional violation not subject to harmless error review 
are “exceedingly rare” and, in applying the harmless error test, the courts find the 
constitutional violation to be harmless with “remarkable frequency.” 
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, 
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record, without regard to errors 
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 
5 See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939); harmless error is “to prevent 
matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and the formalities and minutiae of 
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict;” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 
607, 614-15 (1946); “‘technical errors’” or “[d]eviations from formal correctness do not 
touch the substance of the standards by which guilt is determined in our courts.” 
6 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., “A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-
Century Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule,” Marquette Law Review 93, no. 2 
(2009): 455-56; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., “Harmless Constitutional Error and the 
Institutional Role of the Jury,” Fordham Law Review 76, no. 4 (2008): 2060-65; Steven 
H. Goldberg, “Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief,” The Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminology 71, no. 4 (1980): 440-41; Charles S. Chapel, “The Irony of Harmless 
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that is why, despite its creation in 1919, half-a-decade elapsed before the Court even 
considered extending the doctrine to constitutional violations in criminal cases.7 
America’s founding fathers likely would have challenged the Supreme Court 
justices to a duel had they attempted to invoke a harmless error doctrine to disregard 
constitutional rights in 1791.8 The harmless error doctrine stands in stark contrast to the 
Constitution’s “broader ethical vision”9 to protect both individual rights and larger 
institutional concerns. Thus, for example, the Constitution espouses broad ideals of 
individual autonomy and dignity by resting primary power with the people,10 limiting and 
separating the powers of the government,11 and protecting against unfair and abusive 
                                                          
Error,” Oklahoma Law Review 51 (1998): 515; William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, “Harmless Error,” Journal of Legal Studies 30, no.1 (2001): 181; Helen A. 
Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals,” 
Texas Wesleyan Law Review 17 (2011): 396-400. 
7 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); “If, when all is said and done, 
the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, … the verdict … should 
stand, except perhaps when the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific 
command of Congress.” 
8 As demonstrated by the Burr-Hamilton duel in 1804, the founding fathers were not 
afraid to take up arms. 
9 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. See also Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, 
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” Columbia Law Review 88, no. 1 (1988): 94; 
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516, 532-33; Gregory Mitchell, “Against 
Overwhelming Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review,” California 
Law Review 82, no. 5 (1994): 1366; Vilija Bilaisis, “Harmless Error: Abettor of 
Courtroom Misconduct,” The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 74, no. 2 (1983): 
457-58; Harry T. Edwards, “To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should 
Legal Error Be Tolerated?” New York University Law Review 80, no. 6 (1995): 1194-95; 
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 2052-54. 
10 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516, 
533; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432. 
11 See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, III. See also U.S. Const. art. V; providing the process 
whereby the people retain control over any amendments to the Constitution. 
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government actors and majoritarian control.12 The Constitution also cements the right to 
a public trial before an impartial jury of one’s peers13 to ensure not only individual 
fairness, but also the expression of community values, education of the public, and 
transparency and confidence in the criminal justice system.14 Under the guise of 
streamlining the judicial process and affirming convictions of defendants that appellate 
judges believe to be guilty, harmless error has eroded principles that are fundamental to 
American democracy.15  
Justice Benjamin Cardozo “long ago noted ‘[t]he tendency of a principle to 
expand itself to the limit of its logic.’”16 As scholars have opined, the harmless error 
doctrine has exceeded its logic17 and become the “beast that swallowed the 
Constitution.”18 In today’s criminal justice system, enforcement of constitutional rights in 
                                                          
12 U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV. See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 
457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 
432; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 533; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 2053-56; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1356. 
13 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
14 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13, 1821; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 457-58; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-56; Mitchell, 
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1355-56; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless 
Error,” 536-39; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-96; Daniel Epps, “Harmless Errors 
and Substantial Rights,” Harvard Law Review 131, no. 8 (2018): 2178-80. 
15 See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2151; “There is something unquestionably troubling 
about providing no remedy … for a recognized violation of a right important enough to 
be enumerated in our nation’s founding charter …;” Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 2027; Efficiency and finality concerns are diluting constitutional guarantees. 
16 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1173; quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921): 51. See also Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 426. 
17 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2027; the harmless error doctrine “has 
exceeded the scope of the initial compromise” and we are “approaching a “‘point of no 
return.’” 
18 Martha Davis, “Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and Habeas Jurisprudence: The 
Beast that Swallowed the Constitution,” Thurgood Marshall Law Review 25 (1999): 45. 
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the face of a violation has become the exception rather than the rule.19 In many cases, the 
error is disregarded entirely simply because a small panel of appellate judges believes 
that the defendant is, in fact, guilty.20 Paradoxically, a rule designed to preclude 
defendants from using slight errors to obtain indefinite and unnecessary retrials has 
become a tool for courts, prosecutors, and police to transgress and trade constitutional 
rights for convictions in cases involving life and liberty.21 
Consider the following case, which is riddled with injustice and misconduct:  
Kirk Defendant was tried in 1985 along with his alleged accomplice, Tim 
Defendant, for the 1984 robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder of Donna Hare. 
The prosecution’s case consisted of a confession by Tim, a later confession by Kirk, and 
witnesses that placed Tim at or near the convenience store at which Hare worked and 
from which she was taken. Tim’s confession occurred after more than eleven hours of 
interrogation over two separate sessions, in between which Tim had a “dream” that led to 
his confession story. In it, he implicated Kirk and a third person, Odie, stating they 
robbed the store, abducted Hare, and took her to an area behind a power plant where she 
                                                          
See also Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 421; the doctrine is a “constitutional 
sneak thief.” 
19 See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; The harmless error doctrine has no 
“substantive doctrinal base.” It is an “appellate procedural doctrine which has caused 
‘mischief’ beyond anyone’s expectations.” (Citation omitted). 
20 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also Mitchell, “Against 
Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & n. 112; ibid., 1369; “[T]he Constitution 
entitle[s] a criminal defendant to a fair ‘trial by jury,’ not a ‘trial by appellate court;’” 
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2056; “The jury provisions … reflect … a 
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to 
a group of judges.” 
21 Such control by a small group of judges over the individual rights of Americans is 
precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing protections in the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights. See supra n. 20. 
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was raped. They then took her to an abandoned house behind the plant, where Odie, the 
alleged ringleader, stabbed her to death, after which the men set fire to her body and the 
house, burning it down. After Tim’s confession, Kirk was arrested and, following two 
hours of unrecorded discussions with the police during which he insisted he was at a 
party all that night, he finally confessed substantially the same story as Tim. Kirk had a 
lower-than-average IQ and was suffering post-traumatic stress and guilt relating to his 
mother’s accidental death earlier that year. The police told Kirk that Tim had already 
confessed and implicated him and Odie, and so Kirk might as well confess, too. Two 
days later, Kirk recanted his confession to the police and in letters to his attorney. The 
letters, which also contained alibi witness leads, were intercepted by the police.  
The confessions turned out to be problematic regarding Odie, and he was 
exonerated of any involvement. Before this occurred, however, the prosecution 
interrogated Odie three times, during which officers fed him facts about the crimes and 
after which they brought him to Kirk’s cell for identification. Kirk’s description of Odie 
in his confession did not match Odie and Kirk could not identify Odie when he appeared. 
The police also brought some bones to Kirk’s cell to persuade him to reveal the location 
of the “rest” of Hare’s body because, despite the confessions, they were unable to locate 
any human remains at the burned-up house. 
Early in 1986, Hare’s body was discovered more than thirty miles from where 
Tim and Kirk said the murder occurred. Her cause of death was not stabbing or burning, 
but a single gunshot wound to the head. The owner of the abandoned house also revealed 
that he had personally burned the property down in 1983, a year prior to Hare’s 
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abduction. Nonetheless, the prosecution pressed on, even after it received a pretrial ruling 
that Tim’s confession was not sufficiently reliable and could not be used in Kirk’s trial. 
The men were tried separately. At Kirk’s trial, the prosecution called two 
witnesses who allegedly saw Tim and another man departing with Hare from the 
convenience store. At the urging of the police, the witnesses testified that the second man 
resembled Kirk. In reality, they had described the second man to the police as a 6’2” male 
with sandy brown hair. Kirk is 5’9” with dark brown hair. In addition, the prosecution 
offered the testimony of an often-used jailhouse informant, who said Kirk confessed all 
of the same events to her. Finally, the case investigator took the stand, testified to Kirk’s 
confession, and included statements about Tim’s confession, to corroborate Kirk’s.  
The jury convicted Kirk. Kirk filed an appeal, and the prosecution argued that any 
errors that occurred are harmless. What should the court decide? Does the Constitution 
preclude the actions taken by the police and prosecutors and warrant a new trial for Kirk? 
Because answering these questions requires a thorough understanding of the Constitution 
and the harmless error doctrine, Chapter Two begins by outlining the Constitution’s 
framework, guiding principles, and protective rights, and Chapter Three follows with the 
origin and expansion of the harmless error doctrine to constitutional violations. Chapter 
Four merges the preceding two chapters to demonstrate the constitutional, theoretical, 
and practical problems of applying harmless error review to constitutional infractions, 
while Chapter Five traces the numerous potential solutions for the conflict between 
constitutional rights and the harmless error doctrine proposed by scholars over the 
decades. Finally, Chapter Six closes with my view that the time has come for the Court or 
Congress to rethink the harmless error doctrine’s application to constitutional rights. The 
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Court’s current jurisprudence has so far deviated from the doctrine’s original intent that it 
has disassociated constitutional violations from judicial remedies,22 despite the Court’s 
constitutional obligation to support and defend the Constitution.23 This resulting shift 
impacts not only individual constitutional protections but also the core values and 
integrity of our constitutional system. When government actors or the courts ignore our 
nation’s Constitution and laws, “it breeds contempt for the law; invites every man to 




                                                          
22  See Brandon L. Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 2005, no. 1 (2005): 57, n. 104; see Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1794; the harmless error rule is the “leading contributor to the 
expansive gap between rights and remedies in criminal procedure;” Sam Kamin, 
“Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split,” Virginia Law Review 88, no. 1 (2002): 
5-6; harmless error “has the capacity to permanently sever rights from remedies.”  
23 U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI; Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 
57, n. 104; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510, 517. 
24 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 
1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 457; “Society and the courts have a significant interest in promoting 
confidence in the administration of justice, and in preserving the judicial process from 
contamination by courses of action found illegal or deemed unfair.” 
8 
 
Chapter Two: Constitutional Framework, Principles, and Rights 
 The Constitution of the United States was created by and for the People.25 Indeed, 
the Preamble and Article XII serve as the Constitution’s bookends, establishing thereby 
that it was created by “We the People” and projecting “the message of popular 
sovereignty.”26 The Constitution’s original structure, as drafted by the people’s 
representatives at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, aimed to ensure “life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness” for all people in reaction to the historical abuses of power 
by English monarchs as well as anti-majoritarian sentiments.27 The founders believed that 
a divided government best prevented an “accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,” which they 
deemed “the very definition of tyranny.”28 In order to further constrain the ability of a 
majority in one branch from reducing the people’s influence, however, the founders also 
reasoned that this partition “did not mean that these departments ought to have no 
PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other.”29 Thus, the 
Constitution, in its Articles, establishes fundamental protections of the people’s power 
                                                          
25 U.S. Const. pmbl.; “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”  
26 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 29. 
27 See The Declaration of Independence, ¶ 2.  
28 See The Federalist Papers, No. 47. 
29 Ibid. (Emphasis original). 
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through the separation of governmental powers and a system of checks and balances 
between them.30  
Article I ensures that the people directly elect the members of Congress, who, by 
that election, then represent the people’s voice in the creation of laws that “provide for 
the general Welfare of the United States” and that are “necessary and proper” for carrying 
such laws into execution.31 Congress also possesses many administrative functions, such 
as the ability to investigate executive members of government and to define the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary, which it may use in checking the other branches.32 Article II 
similarly provides that the State legislatures, which are reflections of the people’s will, 
shall appoint representatives to elect the President, who is then responsible for enforcing 
the laws made by the Congress and preserving, protecting, and defending the 
                                                          
30 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926); “The doctrine of the separation of 
powers was adopted … not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction 
incident to the distribution of the government powers among three departments, to save 
the people from autocracy.” (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by, Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 The founders drew from and refined the idea of “separation of powers” from John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government and Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws. 
Locke proposed separating the powers of the executive and legislative branches. See John 
Locke and Peter Laslett, “Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the 
Common-wealth,” in Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 130-31. Montesquieu expanded upon Locke, adding the third judiciary 
branch. Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, “Of the Laws Which 
Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to the Constitution,” in The Complete Works of 
M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1, 197-239.  
31 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. The Congress’ powers include the passage of federal laws, 
establishment of federal courts below the United States Supreme Court, ability to 
override a presidential veto of a proposed law, and ability to impeach the president. See 
Ibid., §§ 1-10. 
32 Ibid., §§ 1-10. 
10 
 
Constitution.33 This enforcement power is reserved to the executive branch, meaning that 
the president can refuse to execute orders from the Supreme Court,34 and also is entitled 
to veto laws coming from Congress, absent a two-thirds majority vote in both houses.35 
Finally, Article III assigns to the people’s senatorial representatives the authority to 
confirm the president’s nomination of federal judges, whose judicial power then extends 
to all cases arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United States, with a specific 
duty to support the Constitution.36 The Supreme Court holds the largest check on the 
other branches through judicial review, which allows it to determine whether a legislative 
or executive action violates any preexisting law and, if so, rule that it is 
unconstitutional.37 
 In addition to the rights and protections implicit in the Constitution, certain 
founders sought to enumerate specific fundamental rights within a Bill of Rights. 
Founder Alexander Hamilton opposed this movement, believing that a bill of rights was 
both unnecessary and dangerous. In Hamilton’s view, the Constitution, by its structure 
and design, already protects fundamental individual liberties. For example, to prevent 
governmental abuse, the people, through their congressional representatives, possess the 
                                                          
33 U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3. The President’s powers include the power to veto a 
proposed law, appoint federal judges and officials, make treaties, ensure that all laws are 
followed, issue pardons, and act as Commander in Chief. See Ibid., §§ 1-4. 
34 See, e.g., Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); President Jackson refused to 
execute the Supreme Court’s order of this case. 
35 U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1-4. 
36 U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI. The Judiciary’s powers include the 
power to try federal cases and controversies, interpret the Constitution, and declare a law 
or executive act unconstitutional. See Ibid. 




power of impeachment; the Constitution prohibits titles of nobility; all trials for crimes 
shall be by a jury of peers; and the Constitution allows speech in the form of political 
dissent without fear of being deemed treasonous. Hamilton added that a Constitution “by 
the people” necessarily means that the government possesses only those powers expressly 
granted to it and that all other powers remain with the people. A bill of rights would 
transgress this principle in two ways: first, express articulation of certain rights might 
imply that other, unmentioned individual rights are excluded from the Constitution and, 
second, limitations placed on certain government powers would suggest that the 
government’s powers otherwise are plenary and not limited by the Constitution. In 
essence, it would give the government powers it did not originally possess and limit the 
people’s rights when the Constitution imposed no such limits.38 Of course, the Bill of 
Rights ultimately was ratified in 1791, although Amendments IX and X do appear to 
address Hamilton’s concerns. Amendment IX clarifies that the enumeration of certain 
rights “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”39 and 
Amendment X reinforces that “powers not delegated to the United States” are “reserved 
… to the people.”40 
 Thus, any assessment of the Constitution and Bill of Rights must begin with the 
understanding that the government does not confer individual rights and liberties on the 
people but, instead, it exists to protect and uphold the rights people possess inherently by 
                                                          
38 See The Federalist Papers, No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton, co-authored with James 
Madison and John Jay). 
39 U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
40 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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virtue of being human beings.41 The question becomes, what rights did the founders 
believe to be so significant that they expressly reinforced them in the amendments to the 
Constitution? Most relevant for purposes of this thesis dealing with harmless error are the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and, by extension, the later addition of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures,43 and guards an individual’s privacy interest, deters 
abusive police conduct violating this right, and results in exclusion of unlawfully 
obtained evidence at trial.44 The Fifth, Six, and Fourteenth Amendments elaborate 
specific guarantees to ensure a fair trial. The Fifth Amendment prohibits charges without 
indictment by a grand jury based on probable cause, being placed in jeopardy for the 
same offense twice, being compelled to incriminate one’s self, and deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.45 This provision of due process is 
furthered by the Fourteenth Amendment, which adds the right to equal protection of the 
laws to prevent bias, prejudice, and discrimination.46 And the Sixth Amendment 
elaborates on trial rights, namely to know the nature and cause of the criminal charge 
pressed, to confront and compel witnesses and have assistance of counsel in presenting a 
                                                          
41 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 509. 
42 While the Eighth Amendment also has bearing, it is not discussed in this thesis. 
43 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
44 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1197-98; 
Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-80. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, 
“New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,” Harvard Law Review 104, 
no. 8 (1991): 1774; arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects only against search and 
seizure and does not provide a personal constitutional right to have the seized evidence 
excluded at trial. 
45 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
46 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
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defense, and to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of peers.47 These 
amendments outline “the minimal parameters” for the jury trial that is required by Article 
3, § 248 for a fair criminal proceeding.49 
Notably, many of these provisions extend beyond protections for criminal 
defendants to larger societal and institutional concerns, particularly in terms of the jury’s 
role as the voice of the community and its ability to reach a just conclusion in the context 
of a procedurally fair trial.50 For example, from the individual defendant’s perspective, 
the amendments ensure jury consideration of reliable and uncoerced evidence in an 
unbiased trial wherein the defendant is enabled to marshal contrary evidence with 
attorney assistance. From a broader perspective, the jury encompasses the “by the 
people” anchor of the Constitution. Just as the ballot serves as a mechanism for the 
people to decide who will represent them in both the executive and legislative branches, 
the jury acts as a means for the people to influence and oversee the judicial branch, which 
includes that branch’s review of executive and legislative decisions.51 The jury possesses 
the power to object to a law of Congress or a prosecutor’s application of such law 
                                                          
47 U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
48 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2; “The Trial of all Crimes … shall be by Jury.” 
49 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510. 
50 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-60; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1355-57; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 536-39; Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1812-22; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-98; Epps, 
“Harmless Errors,” 2178-80.  
51 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2053; Amar, America’s Constitution, 237, 
239, 229-30; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); “Providing an accused 
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against 




through the use of jury nullification and the introduction of mercy in their deliberations.52 
Because of these interests and the importance of the jury’s function as the bulwark 
against tyranny in our democracy,53 which Hamilton described as “a valuable safeguard 
to liberty … [and] the very palladium of free government,”54  the Constitution’s right to 
trial by jury must remain paramount in all considerations of judicial fairness. As the Fifth 
Amendment broadly states, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without first receiving due process of law. And due process, in turn, reflects the 
participatory role of the community through the jury and, thereby, ensures the 
community’s confidence in the legitimacy and reliability of the judicial process and 
safeguards provided by our democratic government.55 
 Articles III and VI state that it is the role of the federal courts to support the 
Constitution.56 While the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall be the 
appellate court, it also grants the legislative branch the power to create inferior federal 
courts, such as the trial courts in which the juries operate and the intermediary appellate 
courts of review.57 Indeed, the existence of a trial court is implicitly presumed, as without 
a trial court the jury would have no venue, and the Supreme Court would have no 
appellate purpose. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Constitution and its 
                                                          
52 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2054-60; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1355-57. 
53 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; “Fear of unchecked power … found expression in the 
criminal law in the insistence upon [jury trials].” 
54 See The Federalist Papers, No. 83. 
55 See supra n. 50-54. 
56 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1. 
57 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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amendments require a jury to act as the arbiter of guilt and justice after a fair trial.58 
Thus, distinctions must be drawn between proceedings in trial courts and appellate courts 
to understand their proper roles within the larger justice system. 
A. The Roles of the Courts 
 Trial courts serve multiple purposes. They provide the public forum for juries to 
make the legal determination to convict or acquit based on findings of fact, for judges or 
juries to impose punishment upon guilty lawbreakers, and for public venting of disputes 
that impact the public interest and public policy. The United States criminal justice 
system is an accusatory one, but also one which presumes innocence unless the 
government proves every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
court must inform a jury of the crime’s legal elements and provide a public forum in 
which it can assess the facts to reach a conclusion of legal guilt or innocence.59 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has condemned the deprivation of life, liberty, or property in secret60 and 
enforced the Sixth Amendment right to a public jury trial, which ensures community 
discourse and oversight in regard to law and accountability, as well as fair and 
trustworthy criminal proceedings for defendants.61 
                                                          
58  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This assumes, of course, that the jury has not been waived. 
59 U.S. Const. amend XIII. 
60 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965); “Essentially, the public-trial guarantee 
embodies a view of human nature true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, 
and jurors will perform their respective functions more reasonably in an open court than 
in secret proceedings. A fair trial is the objective, and ‘public trial’ is an institutional 
safeguard for attaining it.” (Harlan, J., concurring); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 
320-21 (1959); condemning a secret trial held in a police precinct and without benefit of 
counsel. 
61 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2040 & n. 41; Chapel, “The Irony of 
Harmless Error,” 511-12. 
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 In contrast, appellate courts do not provide the public forum for determination of 
guilt and fact-finding, but act to defend the fairness and sanctity of the trial forum by 
identifying and reviewing errors presented there, fixing those errors when found, and 
clarifying the law to steer the course so that the same errors may be avoided in the 
future.62 Errors come in different shapes and sizes. They may involve trial court 
discretionary rulings, such as the exclusion or admission of evidence, which is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, factual determinations, such as a jury’s verdict, which is reviewed 
for clear error,63 or applications of the law, such as statements made in jury instructions, 
which are reviewed de novo.64 When an error was objected to at trial and is raised on 
appeal, the appellate court should correct it, absent harmless error.65 Regarding 
clarification of the law, appellate courts fulfill this role by the issuance of written legal 
opinions, which, in conjunction with stare decisis,66 provide stability to the law and allow 
                                                          
62 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514-15.  
63 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; “Appellate courts never act as fact-
finders for matters which must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt,” or, at least 
they are not supposed to do so. Appellate courts are restricted to reviewing what the trial 
court fact-finders determined because they are in a better position to assess contradictory 
evidence and the credibility of witnesses, having seen them first hand. Ibid., 429. 
64 Susan E. Provenzano et al., Advanced Appellate Advocacy (New York: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2016), 26-39; see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process: Readings, 
Materials and Cases (Eagan: West Publishing Company, 1976), 689; De novo review 
means that the appellate court conducts fresh review of the error, without any deference 
to the trial judge’s decision, whereas abuse of discretion and clear error review both 
afford substantial deference to the decision of the trial judge or the jury. 
65 Provenzano et al., Advanced Appellate Advocacy, 33-34. 
66 Stare decisis “is the principle that a decision made in one case will be followed in the 
next case.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), 7. 
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the public, attorneys, and courts to regulate their future behavior.67 Ultimately, however, 
both trial and appeal courts must aim to preserve and protect the Constitution. Violations 
of constitutional rights, if allowed to go uncorrected, fail the individual whose protections 
are transgressed, fail the institutional democratic ideals promoted by those protections, 
and fail to deter government officials such as police and prosecutors from committing 
abuses, thereby diluting protections against government abuse and tyranny.  
B. The Role of Prosecutors 
 Prosecutors within the executive branch also play a critical role in ensuring that 
constitutional rights are protected. Indeed, it has been stated that prosecutors have “more 
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”68 The 
Constitution in Article VI and Congress by legislation thus both require that upon taking 
the oath of office, prosecutors must swear to “support and defend the Constitution” and 
“bear truth faith and allegiance” to it.69 Almost a century ago, the judicial branch 
reinforced this mandate by more fully articulating the special responsibilities of the 
prosecutor in the American system of justice: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to 
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
                                                          
67 Daniel J. Meador, Thomas E. Baker, and Joan E. Steinman, Appellate Courts: 
Structures, Functions, Processes, and Personnel (Newark: Lexis-Nexis Publishing 
Company, 2006), 5-9. 
68 See Robert H. Jackson, “The Federal Prosecutor,” in American Institute of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 31 (1940): 3. 
69 See U.S. Const. Art. VI; U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1966). 
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justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one.70 
As the Court has stated, and numerous commentators have explained,71 American 
prosecutors occupy a unique position of serving in the dual role of “advocate” and “seeker 
of justice.” On the one hand, “[t]hey are assigned the task of arguing for conviction” and, 
on the other hand, they “have special professional obligations to ensure that the system of 
criminal adjudication is just and procedurally fair [by] … enforcing the law [and] … 
interpret[ing] and apply[ing] the Constitution in good faith.”72 Juries depend on 
prosecutors fulfilling both of these roles, and juries assume that prosecutors will uphold, 
and not violate, constitutional rights.73 Thus, criminal defendants whose rights are 
transgressed suffer a multi-leveled harm; not only are their rights violated, but they are 
prejudiced by the jury’s assumption that no violation could have occurred. Prosecutors are 
                                                          
70 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935). (Emphasis supplied). 
71 See, e.g., Eric S. Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” Southern California Law 
Review 90 (2017); Bruce A. Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect,” Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 30 (2017); Niki Kuches “Appendix A: Report to the ABA 
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Special Responsibilities 
of a Prosecutor,” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 (2009); Bruce A. Green, “Why 
Should Prosecutors ‘Seek Justice’?” Fordham Urban Law Journal 26, no. 3 (1999). 
72 Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 239-40; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak 
Thief,” 438-39. 
73 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88-89. 
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stamped with the imprimatur of rightfully seeking guilt within the framework of a trial that 
is assumed to be fair and just. 
The duty of prosecutors to put justice before convictions does not always reflect 
reality, however, because prosecutors are not always adept at balancing their dual roles 
and because their personal futures often are at odds with this delicate balance. First, their 
role as advocate is premised on the Anglo-American-based “invisible hand” theory that 
by pitting two sides against each other, one side seeking conviction and the other side 
seeking acquittal, the resulting outcome will reflect a well-vetted, accurate, and just jury 
decision.74 By contrast, their role as “ministers of justice” originates from the European 
civilian inquisitorial tradition of a single prosecutor fairly and even-handedly presenting 
all evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, to a single judge in the pursuit of a just 
verdict.75 This combination of adversarial and inquisitorial roles necessarily creates 
conflict for American prosecutors. The former places the prosecutor in the role of a 
gladiator in a contest, while the latter places the prosecutor in a role akin to “second 
                                                          
74 Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 245-46; citing Jon H. Langein, “The Origins 
of Public Prosecution at Common Law,” American Journal of Legal History 17, no. 4 
(1973): 317-18, and Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., “Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution 
Function to Private Actors,” U.C. Davis Law Review 43 (2009): 421-23; both explaining 
that in the historical English and pre-1800 American traditions, criminal punishment was 
through private pursuit of charges against a criminal and, therefore, necessarily 
adversarial in nature.   
75 The civilian legal tradition of many European countries must be contrasted with the 
common-law tradition of England. The former does not employ juries, reflects 
presentation of all facts and law, both positive and negative, to a single adjudicating 
judge, who may also order additional investigation should he or she deem it necessary. 
The latter reflects the adversarial method of two opposing sides presenting their best 
version of the law and facts to a jury, which then applies common sense and community 
values to reach the fairest outcome. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 1977), 38-42. 
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judge” in a neutral proceeding.76 Noting this tension, the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
elevated the prosecutor’s truth-seeking function over it advocacy function, stating that 
“the adversary system of prosecution [must not] descend to a gladiatorial level 
unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth.”77 Policing themselves, 
lawyers have recommended a similar, albeit, nonbinding provision. American Bar 
Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8, comment 1, explicitly states that 
while serving as both an advocate and a minister of justice, a prosecutor has “specific 
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided 
upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that specific precautions are taken to prevent 
and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”78  
The Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual provides similar 
institutional guidelines, and the States’ ethical rules and disciplinary procedures bind 
prosecutors practicing within their jurisdictions.79 The Manual expressly states that its 
provisions are not judicially enforceable by private parties, but the Justice Department’s 
                                                          
76 Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 246-48. 
77 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995) (citations omitted). Accord Berger, 295 
U.S. at 88-89; A prosecutor is “the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” But 
see Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 250; noting that a prosecutor must follow the 
Constitution and judicial interpretations of it, but otherwise may exploit “loopholes” that 
make obtaining a conviction easier as long as the position is taken in good faith. 
78 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8, cmt. 1 (2016). See also ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecutor Function § 3-1.2(b) (1993); “The prosecutor is an 
administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court.” 
79 In 1998, Congress enacted the McDade Amendment after decades-long resistance from 
the Justice Department. The amendment provides that federal prosecutors are governed 
by State ethical rules and disciplinary proceedings in the State(s) in which they work. See 
28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (1998). See Kuches, “Appendix A: Report,” 466-70; detailing the 
debates leading up to the enactment of the McDade Amendment. 
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Office of the Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility are empowered 
to investigate prosecutorial violations internally.80 State codes of professional conduct are 
enforceable based on a complaint by a private party or a judge, and the resulting State 
disciplinary proceedings may lead to several different types of sanctions against an 
attorney, including a prosecutor.81 Comparison of State laws shows that all 50 States have 
adopted ABA Model Rule 3.8, entitled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.”82  
Together, State-law versions of ABA Model Rule 3.8 and the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual impose on prosecutors a series of professional obligations, many of 
which are designed to protect the constitutional criminal procedural rights that appear in 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ABA Model Rule 3.8, as 
complemented by the United States Attorney’s Manuel and other behavioral guides for 
prosecutors, requires that prosecutors shall:  
(a) refrain from indicting a charge without adequate evidence that that the 
defendant committed the crime,83 which supports the Fifth Amendment right to a proper 
                                                          
80 See United States Attorneys’ Manual §§ 1-1.100, 1-4.100 (2015). According to Justice 
Department statistics, for the three-year period of 2015 to 2017, 128 new inquiries into 
alleged violations and 124 new formal investigations were opened. U.S. Dep’t of Justice: 
Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report 2017, accessed January 
16, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/page/file/1082916/download. 
81 Examples of sanctions include attorney suspension, disbarment, reprimand, and, in rare 
cases, the reversal of a defendant’s conviction. See Fish, “Prosecutorial 
Constitutionalism,” 277 & n. 176. 
82 ABA CPR Policy Implementation Committee 2017, accessed January 16, 2019, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
mrpc_3_8.pdf. While at the time of the ABA Report, California’s rules of professional 
conduct were structured differently, they now also contain Rule 3.8. See California Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct (2018). See also supra n. 78 & accompanying text. 
83 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8(a) (2016); United States Attorneys’ Manual §§ 
9-27.200, 9-27.220, 9.27-320 (2015). See also ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecutor Function § 3-4.3 (1993).  
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grand jury indictment and due process,84 and the Fourteenth Amendment right not to be 
targeted in violation of equal protection.85 
(b)-(c) not seek a waiver of an unrepresented defendant’s pretrial rights, but, 
instead, ensure that the defendant has been advised of the right to counsel, how to get 
one, and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain one, 86 all of which support the Sixth 
Amendment.87 
(d), (g-h) make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory, impeachment, 
or other evidence or information tending to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the 
offense, as well as any new such evidence that may later come to light, and even seeking 
release for a wrongful conviction,88 all of which implicates numerous due process 
                                                          
84 U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV. Compare Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8(f) 
(2016); prohibiting prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and others assisting them 
from violating a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial by making extrajudicial 
comments that might trigger or reinforce public condemnation of the defendant. 
85 See Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus, “Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney 
King,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 1 (1995): 2; adding that the double jeopardy clause 
should preclude the dual sovereignty doctrine permitting federal prosecution following 
State prosecution for the same crime, unless the federal prosecution would also promote 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. 
86 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8(b)(c) (2016); National Prosecution Standards § 
2-5.6 (2009); ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecutor Function § 3-3.10(a) 
(1993). See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8(e) (2016); prohibiting a 
prosecutor from interfering with the right to counsel by precluding subpoena of a 
defendant’s lawyer in an effort to indict or prosecute the defendant, except in limited 
circumstances; United States Attorneys’ Manual §§ 9-5.150 (2015); imposing limitations 
on a prosecutor’s ability to seek closed trial proceedings because the Sixth Amendment 
requires a public trial. 
87 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
88 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rule 3.8(d), (g), (h) (2016); United States Attorneys’ 
Manual §§ 9-5.001, 9-11.151, 9-11.231, 9-11.233 (2015). See also ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecutor Function § 3-2.7, 3-3.5, 3-3.6 (1993). And see Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
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constitutional protections relating to the lawfulness of and ability to address evidence and 
witnesses under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.89  
All of the above binding State codes of professional conduct and the Department 
of Justice’s professional guidance manuals serve as extrajudicial tools to ensure 
constitutional prosecutorial behavior. Or, at least, this premise is true in theory. 
Numerous commentators have noted that the States and Justice Department are reluctant 
to hold prosecutors accountable for ethical, even constitutional, violations.90 Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier, a second unfortunate reality is that prosecutors have personal 
reasons for placing obtaining convictions over seeking justice. A prosecutor’s position, 
promotions, and non-governmental career aspirations may depend on maintaining a high 
                                                          
89 U.S. Const. amend. IV, V, VI, XIV. 
90 Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 277-78; Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 462, 
468, 471; Center for Public Integrity, Harmful Error: Investigating America’s Local 
Prosecutors (Washington D.C.: Public Integrity Books, 2003), i, 2; Kathleen M. Ridolfi, 
Maurice Possley, and Northern California Innocence Project, “Preventable Error: A 
Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997-2009,” Northern California 
Innocence Project Publications 2 (2010): 3, 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2/; David Keenan et al., “The Myth of 
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional 
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct,” Yale Law 
Journal 121 (2012): 220; Richard A. Rosen, “Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors 
for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger,” North Carolina Law Review 65, no. 4 (1987): 730-
31; Fred C. Zacharias, “The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors,” North Carolina Law 
Review 79, no. 3 (2001): 751-53; Bruce A. Green, “Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too 
Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement,” St. Thomas Law Review 8 (1995): 
69, 94; Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley, “The Verdict: Dishonor,” Chicago Tribune, 
January 11, 1999,  
http://www.chicagotribune.com/new/watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html; Neil Gordon, 
“Misconduct and Punishment: State Disciplinary Authorities Investigate Prosecutors 




rate of convictions. 91 Prosecutors also face bureaucratic and professional pressures to 
convict, especially if they are elected officials.92 All of these factors disincentivize 
prosecutors from making concessions, based on constitutional rights, that might lower 
their chances of winning. The courts’ willingness to invoke the doctrine of harmless error 
to affirm convictions, despite constitutional errors, exacerbates the conflict presented by 
the prosecutor’s dual role as advocate and seeker of justice by encouraging prosecutors to 
subordinate respect for the Constitution to the desire to convict. Prosecutors, knowing 
that the harmless error doctrine will likely neuter many of their errors, may ignore their 
oath to support the law and Constitution, opting, instead, to elevate convictions and 
personal interests over justice. 
 
                                                          
91 Rachel E. Barkow, “Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law,” Stanford Law Review 61, no. 4 (2008): 883; Prosecutors do not like 
to admit that they might have wasted resources investigating a non-culpable defendant, 
and they are incentivized to seek strong records of conviction and lengthy sentences so as 
to be promoted from within or land high-powered, non-governmental jobs later.  
92 Alex Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” Georgetown Law Journal Annual Criminal Law 
Review 44 (2015): xxvi, xxxviii; Following the release of an innocent man a prosecutor 
had wrongfully convicted 30 years earlier, the prosecutor, tellingly, apologized: 
 
In 1984, I was 33 years old. I was arrogant, judgmental, narcissistic and 
very full of myself. I was not as interested in justice as I was in winning. 
To borrow a phrase from Al Pacino in the movie “And Justice for All,” 
“Winning became everything.” 
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Chapter Three: Harmless Error Then and Now 
 The Constitution’s structure and protection of individual rights support and 
defend the ideal of a fair criminal trial. To understand why the doctrine of harmless 
constitutional error poses a significant danger to this structure and these rights, the 
harmless error doctrine’s origin and evolution must be traced.  
A. The Original Purpose and Evolution of Harmless Error Review 
Despite the Constitution’s creation in 1789, the concept of harmless constitutional 
error did not emerge in American law until almost two hundred years later. It evolved 
from the English system, despite significant differences existing between the two systems 
that, arguably, make harmless error analysis suitable for England, but destructive for the 
United States.93 American appeals proceed on the record created in the trial court and the 
parties briefing regarding alleged errors that were either preserved by objection in the 
trial court or are “plain,”94 with no additional testimony or evidence given on appeal and, 
frequently, the absence of oral argument. The appellate judges assess the record and 
render a written decision, and if the decision is to reverse a conviction, the result is a 
remand to the trial court for a new trial.95 By contrast, English appeals are first screened 
by a single judge, who either grants or denies permission to appeal. If permission to 
                                                          
93 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 506-07, 516-23, 531.  
94 See Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(b); explaining that if a party does not bring a potential error to the 
trial judge’s attention when it occurs, appellate courts apply the more difficult “plain 
error” standard of review, which requires that the complaining party demonstrate four 
things: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected the party’s 
substantial rights; and (4)  the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the judicial proceeding.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). The 
decision of whether the fourth prong is met lies within the appellate court’s discretion. 
95 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 517-18.  
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appeal is granted, the judges proceed on a very different record. The record from the trial 
court is more limited, the parties do not file briefs, and oral argument, at which the parties 
may present new testimony and evidence and raise new errors, plays a significant role.96 
As a general rule, English appellate courts issue an oral decision either dismissing the 
appeal as meritless or allowing it and reversing the conviction or reducing the sentence, 
usually without a remand for a new trial.97 Notably, the standard applied in English 
appeals is the accuracy of the verdict, whereas, in American appeals, appellate courts are 
bound to protect and preserve the constitutional criminal procedural rights contained in 
the written Constitution.98 “The English concept of a fair trial thus requires only that the 
accused be proven guilty. The American concept of a fair trial requires much more,” and 
these “fundamental differences” should influence differential application of the harmless 
error doctrine in the two systems.99 
Despite these differences, the harmless error doctrine developed in the United 
States much like it did in England.100 In England, appellate courts initially used harmless 
error review in the early nineteenth century to affirm convictions if sufficient evidence 
existed, independent of the error.101 Over time, however, judges began to believe that this 
broad harmless error rule violated defendants’ rights, provided inadequate remedies, and 
                                                          
96 Ibid. See https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/appeals-court-appeal. Accessed 
January 25, 2019. 
97 Although English courts may remand for a new trial, this rarely occurs. Chapel, 517-
18. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 519. 
100 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 506. 




caused the rules of evidence to be less carefully considered by the courts.102 Thus, in the 
mid-1830s, a stricter form of review arose called the “Exchequer Rule.”103 The rule 
stated that “a trial error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused 
prejudice” and, therefore, required conviction reversal.104 While this automatic reversal 
rule was intended to protect people’s rights from violations that occurred in their previous 
trials, it also, unintentionally, resulted in overly-strict application of the standard, wherein 
judges would reverse convictions based on any technical error.105 By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the standard became so ingrained in English common law that most trial errors 
found on appellate review resulted in automatic reversal. Not until decades later did 
Parliament enact the Judicature Act of 1873, which implemented a harmless error rule for 
civil disagreements,106 and, even later, in 1907, a harmless error rule for criminal cases 
through the Criminal Appeal Act.107 These Acts were slow to accomplish their intended 
                                                          
102 Craig Goldblatt, “Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress’s Power 
to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante,” University of Chicago Law Review 60, no. 3/4 
(1993): 994. 
103 Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1970), 8. 
104 Wayne R. LaFave, Gerald H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure Vol. 7, 
(Saint Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2015), § 27.6(a). 
105  Crease v Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Exchequer 1835); see also Traynor, Riddle of 
Harmless Error, 8; Justice Traynor says “the Exchequer Rule was not invented … in 
Crease, but rather by the judges who misread the precedent in applying Crease to the 
case of the moment.” Crease does still serve as a historical marker of this change in 
review, however. See Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 435. 
106 See Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 48 (Eng.). 
107 See Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, c. 23, § 4 (Eng.); “Provided that the court may, 
notwithstanding that they are of [the] opinion that the point raised on appeal might be 
decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial 
miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.” The word “substantial” was deleted in 
1966. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1966, c. 31, § 2(1) (Eng.). 
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goals because appellate judges hesitated to apply harmless error to affirm verdicts that 
rested on errors.108 Ultimately, however, the English harmless error rule did prevail.109 
Meanwhile, in America, the Exchequer Rule borrowed from England continued to 
hold sway through the nineteenth century.110 By the early twentieth century, however, it 
became noticeable that appellate judges were reversing criminal convictions based on 
minor errors of form or procedure.111 Commentators labeled the appellate courts 
“impregnable citadels of technicality.”112 In one infamous example, mere omission of the 
word “the” before “peace and dignity” in an indictment resulted in reversal, after which a 
continued cumulation of minor errors resulted in the case being tried-reversed-and retried 
four times before reaching conclusion.113 Defense lawyers became known for placing 
errors in the record, resting easy in the knowledge that even minor errors would overturn 
a conviction and give them a second chance at acquittal.114 Public and professional outcry 
resulted in a coalition that pressed for remedial legislation. Spearheaded by the American 
                                                          
108 Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 11. See also Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2127; 
Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 2032. 
109 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 516-23, 531 
110 See Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 436; “American courts and legislatures seemed to adhere 
steadfastly to practices inherited from the English, long after the English had discarded 
the approach as unsatisfactory.” Daniel J. Meltzer, “Harmless Error and Constitutional 
Remedies,” University of Chicago Law Review 61, no. 1 (1994): 20; quoting Traynor, 
Riddle of Harmless Error, 13-14; John M. Greabe, “The Riddle of Harmless Error 
Revisited,” Houston Law Review 54, no. 1 (2016): 66-67. 
111 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1174. 
112 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 422 & n. 11, quoting, M.A. Kavanaugh, 
“Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power,” 
American Bar Association Journal 11, no. 4 (1925): 222.  
113 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1174. 
114 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 422-23. See also Kamin, “Rights/Remedies 
Split,” 10; trials were transformed into “opportunities ‘for sowing reversible error in the 
record.’” (Citation omitted).  
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Law Institute and the American Bar Association, legal intellectuals such as Roscoe 
Pound, John Henry Wigmore, Felix Frankfurter, and William Howard Taft115 proposed 
adoption of a harmless error law which, in 1919, was enacted as an amendment to the 
Judicial Code. Act 269 provided: “On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, 
or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after 
an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, 
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”116 
Reformers hoped the provision would improve judicial efficiency and enhance public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.117  
Act 269 later was repealed and replaced by two provisions,118 Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(a), to govern proceedings at the trial court level, and 28 U.S.C. § 
2111, to govern review on appeal. Created by the Supreme Court in 1946 under the 
authority granted to it by Congress to promulgate rules of criminal procedure,119 Rule 
52(a) states: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial 
                                                          
115 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 422 & n. 15; Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 437-41.  
116  Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2128; citing Act of Feb. 26, ch, 48, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-
281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 892, 992. 
117 Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 436-437. Ironically, they also recognized that concerns about 
fairness might arise under a standard that allows for affirmance, despite trial errors. They 
therefore endeavored to influence public opinion, the Senate, and the judiciary through 
the use rhetoric by blaming appellate courts for reversing convictions of criminals based 
on mere technicalities, while also pointed out increasing crime rates. Ibid., 443-48.  
Prophetically, Congress initially was reticent to apply harmless error to criminal 
trials for fear that constitutional criminal procedural rights would be “too easily relaxed.” 
David R. Dow and James Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be Harmless?” Utah Law 
Review 2000, no. 3 (2000): 486, 484. 
118 Act of Feb. 26, ch, 48, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 892, 992. 
119 Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 450; Act of June 29, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-675, 54 Stat. 688. 
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rights must be disregarded.”120 Enacted by Congress in 1949, § 2111 provides: “On the 
hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after 
an examination of the record, without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties.”121  
The early cases to discuss the harmless error rule and its relationship to 
substantial rights did so in the context of non-constitutional errors, and while prior-legal 
reformers, Felix Frankfurter and William Howard Taft served as Justices. These Justices 
knew and articulated in their opinions both the harmless error rule’s purposes and its 
limitations: “to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and the 
formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.”122 Justice 
Frankfurter, citing Chief Justice Taft, further explained, “[t]he ‘technical errors’ against 
which Congress protected jury verdicts are of the kind which led some judges to trivialize 
law by giving all legal prescriptions equal potency. Deviations from formal correctness 
do not touch the substance of the standards by which guilt is determined in our courts, 
and it is these that Congress rendered harmless.”123  
                                                          
120 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018). The comments to the rule explain that Rule 52(a) is a 
“restatement” of former Act 269 and that any changes are intended to be stylistic only. 
Ibid., comment (a) & amendment comments. 
121 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018). Like Rule 52(a), § 2111 also “[i]ncorporates” the former 
harmless-error statute, Act 269, without any intention to change its meaning. H.R. Rep. 
No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1949), U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1949, 1248. 
122 Bruno, 308 U.S. at 294 (1939) (Frankfurter, J, writing for a virtually unanimous court, 
with Reynolds, J., concurring only in the result).  
123 See Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15 (1946) (Frankfurter, J); William Howard Taft, 
“Administration of Criminal Law,” Yale Law Journal 15, no. 1 (1905): 15. See also 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927); Chief Justice Taft writing for the Court, of 
which Frankfurter was a member, and rejecting the government’s argument that “the 
evidence shows clearly that the defendant is guilty … and therefore that he cannot 
complain of a lack of due process”. 
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Yet, the statutory term “substantial rights” remained a vague one. In Kotteakos v. 
United States,124 and Bollenbach v. United States,125 the Court clarified the term’s 
meaning, the proper application of harmless error, and its limitations in relation to jury 
determinations. First, the Court explained that appellate judges are not to decide cases as 
if they are the jurors: 
[I]t is not the appellate court’s function to determine guilt or innocence. 
Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to 
how the speculation comes out. … Those judgments are exclusively for 
the jury …. 
[T]he question is, not were [the jurors] right in their judgment, regardless 
of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error 
had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision. The 
crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other 
men, not one’s own, in the total setting.126 [It] … is not whether guilt may 
be spelt out of a record,127 but whether guilt has been found by a jury 
according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials in 
the federal courts.128 
  
                                                          
124 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750.  
125 Bollenbach, 326 U.S. 607. 
126 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted). 
127 Here, the Court was responding to the government’s argument that abundant other, 
untainted record evidence showed that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. 
128 Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15 (Frankfurter, J.). 
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Next, the Court explained the harmless error test as one assessing the impact of the error: 
If, when all is said and done, the [court’s] conviction is sure that the error 
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand, except perhaps when the departure is from a 
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. 
But, if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that 
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to 
conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”129 
Finally, the Court warned against too broad of an application of the harmless error rule: 
From presuming too often all errors to be 'prejudicial,' the judicial 
pendulum need not swing to presuming all errors to be 'harmless' if only 
the appellate court is left without doubt that one who claims its corrective 
process is, after all, guilty. In view of the place of importance that trial by 
jury has in our Bill of Rights, it is not to be supposed that Congress 
intended to substitute the belief of appellate judges in the guilt of an 
accused, however, justifiably engendered by the dead record, for 
ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial guidance, 
however cumbersome that process may be.130 
In Bollenbach, the Court found that a trial judge’s erroneous answer to a jury 
question about what was sufficient evidence to convict was harmful, stating “we cannot 
                                                          
129 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65. (Citations omitted). 
130 Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15. (Emphasis supplied). 
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treat the manifest misdirection in the circumstances of this case as one of those ‘technical 
errors’ which ‘do not affect the substantial rights of the parties …’”131 In Kotteakos, the 
Court held that a variance between an indictment charging one conspiracy and proof that 
established only “separate and distinct offenses” to be harmful, stating “our government 
is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, in his 
being afforded our historic [sic] individual protections, including those surrounding 
criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or complacent ….”132 
B. Application of Harmless Error Review to Constitutional Rights 
 
For many decades, it seemed inconceivable that the harmless error rule would be 
applied to constitutional errors.133 Afterall, a constitutional error could not be viewed as a 
“mere technicality,” and the Court had demonstrated its desire to be protective of 
individual rights in criminal trials.134 In 1963, however, the Court flirted with the 
possibility that harmless error might apply to constitutional violations in Fahy v. 
                                                          
131 Ibid., 614. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760; “a check upon arbitrary action and 
essential unfairness in trials,” “without giving men fairly convicted the multiplicity of 
loopholes.” See also Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S 633, 639 (1946); jury instruction that 
suggested erroneous standard of guilt found harmful. The Court stated, “[n]or is it enough 
for us to conclude that guilt may be deduced from the whole record. Such a course would 
lead to serious intrusions on the historic [sic] functions of the jury under our system of 
government.” 
132 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 773. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 
(1949); erroneous admission of hearsay evidence that implied the defendant was guilty 
was harmful. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the evidence was 
“merely cumulative,” stating “[w]e cannot say that the erroneous admission of the 
hearsay declaration may not have been the weight that tipped the scales against 
petitioner.” 
133 Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 9; “Prior to the 1960s, there was reason to think that 
no error of constitutional dimension could ever be regarded as ‘harmless.’” (Citation 
omitted). 
134 See supra nn. 131-32. See also Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1175. 
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Connecticut.135 There, although an illegal search and seizure occurred in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, and although Mapp v. Ohio136 had held that evidence obtained this 
way was inadmissible and required reversal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that 
the error was harmless under the State’s harmless error statute.137 On writ of certiorari, 
the United States Supreme Court did not directly answer the question of whether 
harmless error applies to federal constitutional violations; instead, it reversed because the 
unlawful evidence introduced at Fahy’s trial was prejudicial.138 In so doing, however, the 
Court made a foundational statement: “the question is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”139 
This statement presaged the standard that the Court would adopt when it finally held, in 
just a matter of years, that the harmless error doctrine applies to federal constitutional 
violations. 
That holding came in Chapman v. California.140 Chapman involved a California 
State provision that allowed the prosecutor to comment on the defendants’ failure to 
testify at trial. After the trial, but before the appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Griffin v. California,141 which invalidated the California provision, holding that 
it violated the Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
                                                          
135 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
136 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
137 Connecticut v. Fahy, 183 A.2d 256, 261-62 (Conn. 1962). 
138 Fahy, 375 U.S. at 91-92. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); 
admission of rifle obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment was “plainly damaging 
evidence,” requiring reversal.  
139 Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87. 
140 Chapman, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
141 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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On appeal, the California Supreme Court recognized Griffin and the constitutional 
violation, but held the error harmless under its State provision forbidding reversal unless 
“the error complained of ha[d] resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”142 The State court’s 
application of this test asked whether, putting aside the error, “overwhelming evidence” 
existed in the record to support the defendants’ convictions.143 The California Supreme 
Court held that such evidence did exist and affirmed. 
Reversing the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court first 
articulated that federal law applies to violations of the Federal Constitution,144 and then 
rearticulated the purpose of the harmless error rule to “block setting aside convictions for 
small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of 
the trial.”145 Next, however, it made a rather shocking statement when juxtaposed against 
the reasons for the harmless error rule: “Although our prior cases have indicated that 
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error,”146 “there may be some constitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent 
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal 
                                                          
142 People v. Tealer, 404 P.2d 209 (1965), citing Cal. Const. art. VI, § 4.5 (1965). 
143 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 
144 Ibid., 22; Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 16; This result was “born of concern that 
state courts, if left free to apply their own harmless error standards, would dilute federal 
constitutional norms by too easily finding that constitutional errors were not prejudicial,” 
quoting Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 5; ibid., 1-6; explaining that federal law 
preempts state law in matters presenting federal constitution questions; ibid.; noting that 
in 1891, Congress created a statute granting all federal criminal defendants a right of 
appeal, citing Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517; § 5, 2, 5 State 826. 
145 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. 
146 See infra Pt. D; discussing the difference between “structural” errors, which require 
automatic reversal, and “trial” errors, which are subject to harmless error review. 
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of the conviction.”147 The Court then fashioned a harmless error test to be applied to 
these “unimportant and insignificant”  constitutional violations that differed from both 
the California test and the federal test applied to non-constitution errors under Kotteakos.  
First, the Court rejected the California test that put aside the error and looked for 
“overwhelming evidence” of guilt, noting that the federal harmless error statutes focus on 
harm to “substantial rights,” not on “miscarriage of justice.”148 Next, the Court placed the 
burden of proving harmlessness on the government because the government is the 
beneficiary of the constitutional violation. Finally, opting not to adopt the Kotteakos 
standard but, instead, drawing upon its prior statement in Fahy, the Court said that the 
Fahy test effectively required the government either “to prove that there was no injury or 
to suffer reversal,” and that this test differed little, if at all, from the standard it was 
articulating now as the appropriate test for constitutional violations.149 For federal 
constitutional violations, “[the government must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the [constitutional] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict,”150 and “the 
                                                          
147 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. (Emphasis supplied). 
148 Notably, the first proposed American federal harmless error statute in 1908 proposed 
using the “miscarriage of justice” standard, which most believed meant a “correct result 
was reached” approach. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64. Congress 
rejected this approach in 1919 and, instead, focused on the error and its effect on 
substantial rights. Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2128, citing Act of Feb. 26, ch, 48, 1919, 
Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 
892, 992. By contrast, in England, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 allowed dismissal of 
the appeal if the judges found “no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually 
occurred.” See Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, c. 23, § 4 (Eng.). 
149 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24. (Emphasis supplied).  
150 Ibid., 23-24. (Emphasis supplied). Contrast Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65; whether 
“fair assurance” exists that “the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” 
Several commentators have argued that the Supreme Court was wrong to apply harmless 
error to federal constitutional violations. Compare Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak 
Thief,” 421; calling it “among the most insidious of legal doctrines;” James Edward 
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court must be able to declare a belief that [the constitutional error] was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”151 Ultimately, in Chapman, the Court determined that the Griffin 
violation was not harmless because the State’s argument and trial court’s instruction 
repeatedly urged the jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendants’ silence at trial, 
thus turning their right to remain silent into a form of self-incrimination.152 
Many believed that the Chapman harmless error standard closely resembled the 
automatic reversal rule and would lead appellate courts to reverse convictions in most 
cases presenting constitutional errors.153 In reality, the opposite occurred. While the test 
                                                          
Wicht, III, “There is No Such Thing as Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a 
Rule of Automatic Reversal,” Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 12, no. 1 
(1997): 109; “[T]oleration of the harmless error rule in the Constitutional context reflects 
poorly on the value now placed on individual rights. … [T]he current rule undermines the 
inherent value of constitutional rights.” But see Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1339 & n. 23; noting Goldberg’s position as well-founded, but 
believing that harmless error review is here to stay, stating that “the Court has not once 
[re]considered the validity of the doctrine.” 
 Presumably, under U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8, Congress possesses the power to 
pass a federal law overruling or modifying the harmless error tests adopted by the 
Supreme Court. See Henry P. Monaghan, “The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law,” Harvard Law Review 89, no. 1 (1975): 2-3. To date, 
Congress has not chosen to do so.   
151 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
152 Ibid., 25-26. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the 
Chapman standard only applies to constitutional errors raised on direct appeal and not 
those raised on habeas corpus review, which, instead, are reviewed under the Kotteakos 
standard. This thesis addresses only direct review of federal constitutional violations and 
not habeas corpus collateral review. 
153 See Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 43-44; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1342-43. As Chief Judge Chapel explains, both Justice Traynor and 
Professor Saltzburg miss the Court’s nuanced use of the Fahy test to fashion a new 
articulation for assessing harmless constitutional errors. The Court used Fahy as a 
jumping off point; it did not endorse the test articulated by the Court in Fahy as the test.  
Professor Saltzburg, thus, wrongly argues against the “reasonable doubt” standard 
included in the Chapman test in favor of the “reasonable possibility” language employed 
in Fahy. Justice Traynor similarly argues incorrectly for a “highly probable” test. Chapel, 
“Irony of Harmless Error,” 524, n. 139. As aptly noted by Anne Bowen Poulin, these 
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under Chapman hinges on the “federal constitutional error [being] … harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt,”154 it has been “diluted” in its application, even “distorted” beyond its 
“contemplation.”155 Just two years after Chapman, the Court announced its decision in 
Harrington v. California,156 which – despite its “special facts”157 – has served as the 
seminal case for applying the “overwhelming evidence” harmless error test to 
constitutional errors, even though the Court expressly rejected that test in Chapman. 
Dissenting in Harrington, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Marshall called 
it as they saw it, stating: “The Court today overrules Chapman v. California.”158 
Meanwhile, the Harrington majority claimed: “We do not depart from Chapman; nor do 
we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it.”159 
Such a stark difference of opinion somewhat defies explanation. On the one hand, 
the mere fact that the majority and dissent, albeit applying different tests, reached 
different outcomes, should itself demonstrate that the constitutional error was not 
                                                          
standards are not the same, and they fall on a spectrum that runs from more government-
friendly to more defendant-friendly, which, of course, makes a difference in error 
assessment. Ann Bowen Poulin, “Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred 
Lines,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 17 (2015): 1007-13.  
Apply this ranking to the three standards just discussed, they would run from more 
government-friendly (“highly probable”) to in-between (“reasonable possibility”) to more 
defendant-friendly (“beyond a reasonable doubt”). Ibid.  
154 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
155 See Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1007; That the Chapman test is hinged to reasonable 
doubt is clear; dilution of the test has occurred as a result of “the manner in which it has 
been applied.” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 426; post-Chapman cases 
“relaxed the rigor of the test and applied it to circumstances which could not have been 
contemplated and, indeed, would have been disavowed by the Chapman majority.” 
156 Harrington, 395 U.S. 250. 
157 Ibid., 251, 253; The majority noted the “special facts” of the case twice in its opinion. 
See also ibid., 254; “Our decision is based on the evidence in this record.” 
158 Ibid., 255 (dissent).  
159 Ibid., 254 (majority). 
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“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” At the least, it made proper articulation of the 
governing legal test critical to the case outcome. On the other hand, one explanation for 
the Court’s split not proposed in scholarly commentary could be that the majority 
intended to limit the holding of Harrington to its “special facts.”160 The majority opinion 
is extremely short (barely more than one page) and describes the erroneously admitted 
evidence as cumulative of other evidence, including the defendant’s statement.161 But it is 
questionable whether the highest court in the land, which leads the entire federal judiciary 
and the decisions of which have a lasting impact on the nation, should decide a case 
based simply on its peculiar facts. Under Article 3, § 2, juries are supposed to be the 
arbiters of facts and legal guilt or innocence.162 Further, it is doubtful whether the 
Supreme Court would change the legal test if its sole aim was to correct a perceived, 
peculiar factual error.163 Nevertheless, the test applied by the Harrington majority had a 
lasting impact on the development of harmless error review of constitutional violations. 
                                                          
160 See supra n. 157 & accompanying text. 
161 Harrington, 395 U.S. at 253-54. See infra n. 177; explaining that the writing justice in 
Harrington dissented from its application in a later case that also involved a Bruton 
violation but different facts. 
162 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; “Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”  
163 See Supreme Court Rule 10 (1967), accessed January 25, 2019, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/rules/rules_1967.pdf; Appropriate considerations for 
granting review include such things as “compelling” legal issues arising from federal 
circuit court conflicts and federal or state decisions impacting important federal legal 
questions. The Supreme Court does not generally grant certiorari to review cases based 
on their facts. Compare Supreme Court Rule 10 (2017), accessed January 25, 2019,  
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf; which today 
states, “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error 
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 
law.” (Emphasis supplied). 
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As in Chapman, Harrington presented the Court with the situation of applying a 
new constitutional holding to a case decided before it was announced. After the state-
court trial and appellate affirmance of Harrington’s conviction for felony murder, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Bruton v. California,164 which held that, in a joint 
trial, a co-defendant’s confession that implicates the defendant may not be admitted 
unless the confessing defendant testifies, because to allow otherwise would violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. As the majority describes the 
Harrington facts: several eyewitnesses placed Harrington at the scene of the crime, as did 
Harrington himself; of the three co-defendant confessions admitted, the one co-defendant 
who implicated Harrington in the crime testified at trial and was subjected to cross-
examination; the other two co-defendants did not testify but were unable to name 
Harrington and could only state that the fourth perpetrator was “the white guy;” finally, 
the trial judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury that it was to consider each 
confession only against the confessor.165 After outlining these facts, the majority held that 
the case against Harrington was “so overwhelming” that the “violation of Bruton was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, unless we adopt the minority view in Chapman [] 
                                                          
164 Bruton v. California, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Bruton decision was handed down in 
May of 1968 whereas the state court review in Harrington reached its terminal point in 
January of 1968, when the California Supreme Court denied review. See People v. Bosby, 
256 Cal. App. 2d 209 (Ct. App. 1967), review denied (Cal., 01-18-1968), affirmed sub 
nom., Harrington, 395 U.S. 250. 
165 Harrington, 395 U.S. at 251-53. The majority’s description of the facts suggests that it 
might, alternatively, have held that no Bruton constitutional error occurred because the 
non-testifying co-defendants’ confessions did not implicate Harrington.  Of course, the 
dissent described the case facts differently, highlighting how far afield from a court of 
legal review the Court had moved, given each side’s in-depth factual review (and, 
perhaps, spin) of the record. As a deserved reminder, U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2 requires that 
jurors – not appellate judges – serve as the arbiters of fact and guilt. 
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that a departure from constitutional procedures should result in an automatic reversal, 
regardless of the weight of the evidence.”166 It further stated, “[o]ur judgment must be 
based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the 
probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.”167 
As the dissent noted in reaching a contrary result by applying the Chapman 
standard, the majority had shifted the legal test. The majority first set up a compelling 
factual statement to convince any reasonable reader that the defendant was, in fact, guilty. 
It then altered the Chapman test by including review of the untainted record evidence to 
look for “overwhelming evidence” of guilt; by importing a “probable impact” standard 
rather than one based on “beyond a reasonable doubt;” and by pushing the jurisprudence 
farther away from the automatic reversal rule while expanding the potential category of 
constitutional errors subject to harmless error review. The dissent astutely recognized that 
the majority was not only changing the course of the development of harmless error law 
but promoting appellate court usurpation of the jury’s role as finders of fact and legal 
guilt.168 Harmless error in the context of constitutional violations moved from the 
“narrowly circumscribed” focus on the error and its harmlessness only in situations where 
it “made no contribution to the criminal conviction,” to a focus “away from” the error to 
the surrounding record evidence, which Chapman, itself, had disavowed.169 Moreover, 
                                                          
166 Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254. (Emphasis supplied). See also ibid., the evidence was 
“so overwhelming, that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless 
error, we must leave the state conviction undisturbed.” (Emphasis supplied).  
167 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied). 
168 Ibid., 255-57 (dissent); see also Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 525-56; noting 
that this shift has enabled the Court to pay lip-service to the Chapman standard while 
applying a fact-based, “overwhelming evidence” test. 
169 Harrington, 395 U.S. at 255 (dissent). 
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the arbiters of this shifted-test would not be jurors, but appellate judges, who, in groups 
of three, would be making factual determinations to assess guilt or innocence.170 In the 
dissent’s view, “apply[ing] [sufficiency or substantiality of the evidence] standards as 
threshold requirements to the raising of constitutional challenges to criminal convictions 
is to shield from attack errors of a most fundamental nature and thus to deprive many 
defendants of basic constitutional rights.”171 Ominously, the dissent also noted the 
dilution of constitutional criminal procedural rights: “As a result [of the majority’s shift], 
the deterrent effect … on the actions of both police and prosecutors, not to speak of trial 
courts, will be significantly undermined.”172 
 Following England’s lead, the United States’ conversion to an “overwhelming 
evidence” test seemed set.173 But, as previously noted, the differences between the two 
systems made this test appropriate for England, but not necessarily for American. In 
England, appellate judges may review new evidence and arguments and reach different 
factual conclusions in determining whether a “miscarriage of justice occurred.”174 In 
                                                          
170 Ibid., 256 (dissent); “The [proper] task of appellate courts is to appraise the impact of 
tainted evidence on a jury’s decision. …” (Emphasis supplied). 
171 Ibid., 257 (dissent). 
172 Ibid., 255 (dissent). See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427-28; noting that 
Harrington’s conviction would have been reversed had the Chapman standard been 
properly applied. 
173 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 526; arguing that by the mid-1970s, the 
Harrington approach “was firmly entrenched in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as the 
test of harmless error. (Emphasis original); But see Provenzano, et al., Advanced 
Appellate Advocacy, 34; asserting that only a minority of federal circuit courts use the 
“overwhelming evidence” test and that the majority look at the prejudicial effect of the 
error on the jury.  
174 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 506-07, 517-123, 531. See 




America, appellate judges are limited to the trial record and the fact-findings of the jury, 
and the statute directs review of the “error’s” impact on “substantial rights,” making 
appellate court weighing of the untainted record evidence procedurally and 
constitutionally inappropriate.175 Nonetheless, with rare exceptions, the United States 
Supreme Court continued to affirm criminal convictions by applying the Harrington 
harmless error test, while paying lip-service to the Chapman standard.176 Thus, just three 
years after Harrington, the Court affirmed convictions in Schneble v. Florida177 and 
Brown v. United States,178 despite Bruton violations in those cases, and in Milton v. 
Wainwright,179 despite a coerced confession in that case. In Scheble, the Court employed 
a “probable impact” standard and, arguably, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 
                                                          
175 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2; right to jury trial in criminal case; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; 
reiterating the purposes for that right. As noted by Goldberg, “until the Court approved 
the ‘overwhelming evidence’ approach to harmless error, no court had the power to enter 
a guilty verdict on its own judgment when the defendant properly exercised his right to a 
trial by jury.” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427. 
176 C.f. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 255; the dissent opining, “[in Chapman], we left no doubt 
that for an error to be ‘harmless’ it must have made no contribution to a criminal 
conviction.” (Emphasis supplied). See Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 57; While 
the Warren Court had been protective of “fair trial rights, the Rehnquist Court 
assiduously preserved th[e] [Court’s] landmark rulings as a constitutional matter, while 
weakening the rights in an indirect way by limiting the remedies for their violation, by 
ratcheting the strength of the doctrine of harmless error.” 
177 Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). Notably, Justice Douglas, who had authored 
the majority opinion in Harrington, dissented from the application of Harrington in 
Schneble, stating “[t]hat decision was limited to a factual setting in which the defendant 
admit[ted] being at the scene, and the improperly admitted statements of the co-
defendants [were] merely cumulative evidence.” Ibid., 433. Justice Douglas did not 
dissent from the companion case of Brown v. United States, infra n. 178 & accompanying 
text, which also involved a Bruton error, but closely mirrored the facts presented in 
Harrington.  
178 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1973); “The testimony erroneously 
admitted was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted 
evidence properly before the jury.” 
179 Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
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After citing Chapman, it stated that it was required to determine the outcome based on 
“‘our own reading of the record and [] what seems to us to have been the probable impact 
… on the minds of an average jury,’” and it “conclude[d] that the ‘minds of an average 
jury’ would not have found the State’s case significantly less persuasive had the [co-
defendant’s] testimony … been excluded.”180 In Milton, the Court went even further, 
assuming, without deciding, that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, and affirming 
the conviction because “the record clearly reveal[ed] that any error in its admission was 
harmless,” as the defendant had made three prior confessions.181 The majority did not 
mention that the three prior confessions occurred after an 18-day interrogation, without 
counsel, and with the defendant denying guilt for ten days and only cracking after two 
detectives tag-team questioned him for eight hours straight. Noting the improper factual 
manipulation and review by the majority, the dissent accused the majority of ignoring the 
question presented, namely “whether the great constitutional lesson of Powell v. 
Alabama182 [that a defendant has a right to counsel] is to be ignored.” The dissent “would 
not [have] ignore[d] it, but would [have] honor[ed] its ‘fundamental postulate . . . ‘that 
                                                          
180 Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432. See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 428; “By a 
subtle rearrangement of words and ideas, Justice Rehnquist converted a test which forced 
the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict, into a test which forced the defendant to show that the error was of such 
significance that without it the defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict of 
acquittal.” 
 As in Harrington, the dissent in Schneble again objected that “[u]nless the Court 
intends to emasculate Bruton …. or to overrule Chapman [], … then I submit that its 
decision is clearly wrong.” Ibid., 437 (dissent). 
181 Milton, 407 U.S. at 372. 
182 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard.’”183 
 The power of the harmless error doctrine over constitutional violations became 
firmly entrenched. Within ten years, the Supreme Court held that harmless error analysis 
is required to be applied, despite the magnitude of the constitutional violation or even 
prosecutorial misconduct taking advantage of the violation. Federal courts may not 
employ their supervisory power to overturn a conviction, absent a finding of harmful 
prejudice to the defendant.184 The considerations guiding supervisory power – 
implementation of a remedy for violation of rights, preservation of judicial integrity in 
criminal trials, and deterrence of unlawful conduct – were not sufficient, in the Court’s 
view, to justify reversal of a conviction and a retrial.185 Turning the original, limited 
purpose for the harmless error doctrine on its head and prioritizing it as more important 
than fundamental constitutional rights, the Court deemed the above interests to be 
“[in]significant” “when the error to which [they] are addressed is harmless.”186 A few 
years later, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,187 the Court went even further, stating “the 
                                                          
183 Milton, 407 U.S. at 383-84 (dissent); also noting that none of the prior four federal 
courts that considered Milton’s case had found the error to be harmless. 
184 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); there, the trial court had reversed the 
defendant’s conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, and the Seventh Circuit had 
affirmed, noting that the misconduct repeatedly was arising in that district. The Supreme 
Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 250, 253 (1988); stating a court does not have authority to dismiss an 
indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct without a finding of prejudice to the 
defendant. 
185 Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505. 
186 Ibid., 506. The Court also chastised the Seventh Circuit for not considering the trauma 
that the victims would suffer in having to undergo a retrial.  
187 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). There, the defendant had been 
precluded from cross-examining a witness about a deal he struck with the prosecution in 
46 
 
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence.”188 It cited numerous factors that inform whether a conviction should be 
reversed under harmless error analysis, including “the importance of the witness’ 
testimony in the prosecution’s case; whether the testimony was cumulative; the presence 
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points; the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and, of course, the 
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”189 Rather than clarifying harmless error law, 
the Court contributed to the confusion by creating yet another test and, seemingly, 
rendering the constitutional error merely one of many factors for consideration.190 
C. Harmless Error Review When the Jury Does Not Make a Required Finding 
 Appellate review, even for harmless error, should depend on having something to 
review, and that something should be a finding of the jury in a jury trial. In In re 
Winship,191 the Court recognized that it is the jury’s role to find that the elements of the 
charged crime are proved beyond a reasonable doubt and it is the prosecution’s burden to 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. When the defendant exercises 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Constitution does not allow a judge to find 
                                                          
return for testifying against the defendant. The Court remanded the case to the Delaware 
Supreme Court to conduct harmless error analysis because the Delaware Supreme Court 
had erroneously found the error to be structural. See infra Pt. D. 
188 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. 
189 Ibid., 684. 
190 See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1345-46, 1342; claiming 
the Court created a new, third hybrid test different from the two Chapman and 
Harrington tests, thereby engendering “considerable confusion;” Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
“The Harm of Harmless Error,” Virginia Law Review 59, no. 6 (1973): 988; “Chaos 
surrounds the standard for appellate review of errors in criminal proceedings.”  
191 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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that the elements are met or to direct a verdict of guilt.192 Nevertheless, in Rose v. 
Clark,193 the Court extended harmless error “review” even to cases where the jury had 
not made a finding regarding an element of the charged crime. In Rose, the trial court had 
shifted the burden of proof for the element of malice by instructing the jury that all 
homicides are presumed to be malicious unless the defendant rebuts that presumption.194 
A divided Court held that harmless error review applied and remanded to the State court 
to make that determination. In so doing, it expressly turned the harmless error exception 
into the general rule, stating that when “a defendant had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have 
occurred are subject to harmless error analysis.”195 It guided the State court’s decision on 
remand by declaring that if the record, as a whole, established guilt, then “the interest of 
                                                          
192 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. V (due process), VI (right to impartial 
jury), XIV (application to the States). See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155; “The 
guarantee[] of jury trial … reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered” and “is a fundamental right.” In re Winship, 
397 U.S. at 364; “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged.” 
193 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). 
194 Previously, in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the Court had held that a 
jury instruction stating “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 
consequences of his voluntary acts” violates Due Process. The Court left open, however, 
the question of whether harmless error review could be applied to such an instruction. 
Ibid., 527-28. Later, in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), the Court’s plurality 
decision revealed a four-four-one split regarding whether harmless error review applies to 
this instruction. Ibid. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall opposed 
harmless error review unless the defendant either was acquitted or admitted the element 
at issue; Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O’Connor favored harmless error 
review, generally; and Justice Stevens believed the issue was not a federal one and should 
be left to the State court’s determination. 
195 Rose, 478 U.S. at 579. 
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fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.”196 Concurring in the 
judgment only, Justice Stevens objected to the majority’s conversion of Chapman’s 
rigorous harmless error exception into the general rule, its sole focus on trial reliability 
when the Constitution protects values beyond the “truth-seeking function,” and the 
danger of encouraging prosecutors to “subordinate” constitutional rights to their desire to 
obtain convictions.197 Dissenting, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall believed the 
erroneous instruction required automatic reversal because the Constitution requires that 
the jury make all elemental findings and forbids both trial judges, in the first instance, 
and appellate judges, on review, from making those findings for the jury.198 
 With the entrance of Justice Antonin Scalia to the Court, harmless error review of 
jury non-findings appeared to shift as his viewpoint coincided more closely with the Rose 
dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Thus, when the Court, in Carella 
v. California,199 issued a per curiam decision that a jury instruction imposing a state-law 
mandatory presumption of intent violated Due Process, these four justices concurred only 
in the judgment and outlined a limited application of harmless error in this context. They 
explained that such review should not – as was stated in Rose – seek to uncover whether 
the record, as a whole, supports conviction. To allow such judicial review would be to 
“‘invade[] the fact-finding function which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the 
                                                          
196 Ibid., 578-79, 580 & n.8. Accord Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
197 Rose, 478 U.S. at 585-89 (concurrence). 
198 Ibid., 590-95 (dissent); “A trial that was fundamentally unfair … because the jury was 
not compelled to perform its constitutionally required role, cannot be rendered 
fundamentally fair in retrospect by what amounts to … an appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.” Ibid., 590. 
199 Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989). 
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jury.’”200 Only in three instances should an instruction with an unconstitutional 
presumption or one that omits or seriously misdescribes an element be deemed harmless: 
(1) when the defendant was acquitted of the crime; (2) when the defendant admitted the 
crucial element;201 or (3) “[w]hen the predicate facts relied upon in the instruction, or 
other fact necessarily found by the jury, are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be 
presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate 
fact.”202 When none of these circumstances occur, overwhelming record evidence of guilt 
is irrelevant because the jury will not have made a required finding susceptible to review, 
and appellate judges are not free to make the finding for it.  
A few years later, in Sullivan v. Louisiana,203 the Court reconfirmed the proper 
roles of the jury and the appellate court. Again writing, Justice Scalia this time 
commanded a unanimous Court in holding that an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction 
is not a harmless error because it violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and 
Fifth Amendment right to Due Process. As the Court explained, “[t]he [harmless error] 
inquiry [under Chapman] … is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a 
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”204 In Sullivan’s case, without 
a proper reasonable doubt instruction, there could be no valid jury verdict. And without a 
                                                          
200 Ibid., 267-73. 
201 The first two instances of harmless error were mentioned in the plurality opinion of 
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73. 
202 Carella, 491 U.S. at 270-71. The third instance of harmlessness occurred in Pope, 481 
U.S. 497, where the jury was misinstructed to consider community values, rather than a 
reasonable person standard, in determining the issue of obscenity. 
203 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
204 Ibid., 279. (Emphasis original). 
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valid jury verdict, no object existed for review of any kind, harmless or otherwise.205 
“The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt – not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional 
error.” 206 An appellate court is not free to “speculate” about what a reasonable jury, 
hypothetically, might have decided. If such appellate guesswork occurs, then “the wrong 
entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.”207 The determination of guilt or innocence rests 
with the actual jury of the defendant’s case, said the Court, and the consequences of the 
denial of that jury determination are “unquantifiable and indeterminate.”208 Thus, as of 
Sullivan, the Court seemed primed to reign in harmless error review and protect the jury’s 
“fundamental” role in the “American scheme of justice.”209 
This protection did not last long, however. Six years later, in Neder v. United 
States,210 the Court reverted to the “overwhelming evidence” analysis espoused in Rose v. 
Clark211 even though, in Rose, the Court stated that its analysis would have been different 
if, rather than a presumption instruction, it had addressed an instructional error that 
                                                          
205 Ibid. “If there being no [valid] jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the 
question whether the same verdict … would have been rendered absent the constitutional 
error is utterly meaningless.” (Emphasis original). 
206 Ibid., 281; citing Bollenbach (1946). (Emphasis original). 
207 Ibid., 280-82; “misdescription of the burden of proof … vitiates all the jury’s 
findings.” Ibid., 281. (Emphasis original). 
208 Ibid., 281-82. 
209 Ibid. But, Justice Rehnquist did concur to note that a defective reasonable doubt 
instruction is a “breed apart” from other instructional errors. Ibid., 284. 
210 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
211 Rose, 478 U.S. 570. 
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“prevent[s] a jury from considering an issue.”212 The latter scenario is precisely what 
occurred in Neder – as did obliteration of the proper roles for the jury and judges in 
criminal trials. Even worse, Neder could have been quickly and cleanly affirmed using 
one of the three Carella exemptions – omission of an element which the defendant did 
not contest. In Neder, the element withheld from the jury and, instead, found to exist by 
the trial judge, was the undisputed element of materiality.213 
The majority instead used Neder as a vehicle for reestablishing the Rose test and 
extending it to the omission of criminal elements from jury instructions. According to 
Sullivan, the failure of the jury to determine a required element of the crime – which the 
government was required to prove to it beyond a reasonable doubt – should have 
rendered the jury’s verdict invalid and unreviewable. Yet, the Neder majority concluded 
that Sullivan presented a unique case where all of the jury findings were vitiated by the 
instructional error and that any broader reading of Sullivan did not “square with … 
harmless-error cases.”214 And, rather than using the easily-applicable Carella exemption 
for non-instruction of an element that the defendant did not contest, the majority 
purposefully rebuffed Carella’s three harmless error rules as both too “restrictive” and 
too case-specific.”215 Instead, if “[i]t [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
                                                          
212 Ibid., 578-79; “Because a presumption does not remove the issue of intent from the 
jury’s consideration, it is distinguishable from other instructional errors that prevent a 
jury from considering an issue.” Ibid., 580 & n. 8. Justice Rehnquist also distinguished 
errors that do not “remove[] an element of the offense from the jury’s consideration in 
Sullivan.” See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283. 
213 Neder, 527 U.S. at 7; the element of “materiality was not in dispute.” 
214 Ibid., 10-11. 
215 Ibid., 13-14. 
52 
 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error, then the instructional 
omission is harmless.216 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens objected to the majority’s harmless 
error review both analytically and principally, just as he had in Rose. Analytically, he 
believed the case fit clearly within the Carella parameters for finding an error harmless. 
Principally, he viewed the majority opinion as “[in]sensitive to the importance of 
protecting the right to have a jury resolve critical issues.”217 Justices Scalia, Souter, and 
Ginsberg issued a vehement dissent.218 They noted that, in the Constitution, the people 
reserved to themselves, as jurors, the right to determine guilt precisely because of their 
distrust of prosecutors and judges. The Constitution does not afford a trial judge the right 
to direct a verdict of guilty or an appellate judge the right to scour the record for evidence 
of guilt, despite the constitutional error. By resorting back to the Rose test, the majority 
missed the distinction between “confirming the jury’s verdict” and “making a judgment 
that the jury has never made.”219 In their view, the majority in Neder ignored their proper 
role as appellate judges and created a gateway for “trampl[ing] over the jury’s 
function.”220 It placed judicial expediency over constitutional bedrock, thereby shifting 
the democratic foundation: “Whereas Sullivan confined appellate courts to their proper 
role of reviewing verdicts, the Court [] put[] the appellate courts in the business of 
                                                          
216 Ibid., 18 (concurrence). 
217 Ibid., 25-29. 
218 Ibid., 38 (dissent). 
219 Ibid., (dissent). (Emphasis original). 
220 Ibid., 36 (dissent). 
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reviewing the defendant’s guilt” when the Constitution expressly requires the opposite as 
a protection of our liberty.”221  
D. Structural Error: The Few Constitutional Rights that Remain Inviolate 
 
After Neder, the Court has continued to apply harmless error review to an 
expanding list of constitutional violations and limited automatic reversal to a small, select 
group of errors.222 In Chapman, the Court had stated that “some constitutional rights [are] 
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated a harmless error,”223 citing 
as examples cases involving an impartial trial judge,224 the denial of the right to counsel 
at trial,225 and the admission of a coerced confession.226 Other than these three examples, 
however, the Court did not offer guidance for determining which constitutional violations 
would be shielded from harmless error review.227 That framework would come twenty-
five years later, in Arizona v. Fulminante,228 where a splintered Court listed sixteen 
sample constitutional errors susceptible of harmless error review,229 added coerced 
confessions to that list despite Chapman’s statement to the contrary, and established a 
distinction between “trial” errors, to which harmless error applies, and “structural” errors, 
                                                          
221 Ibid., 39-40 (dissent). (Emphasis original). 
222 See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1176-77, 1180; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 
527; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 
1184-86 & n. 81; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1339 & n. 23; 
Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 421 n. 3. 
223 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. 
224 Ibid., 23 n. 8; citing Tumey, 273 U.S. 510. 
225 Ibid., 23 n. 8; citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
226 Ibid., 23 n. 8; citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
227 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2037-38. 
228 Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279.  
229 Ibid., 306-07. 
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to which it does not apply.230 According to the Court, “trial” errors “occur[] during the 
presentation of the case to the jury, and [] may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the 
context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [the] admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”231 By contrast, “structural” errors are “defects in 
the constitution of the trial mechanism,” whereby “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from 
beginning to end is … affected,” because the defect is in “the framework within which 
the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.”232 “Structural” 
defects, thus, implicate such “basic protections” that their deprivation renders the 
criminal trial both an unreliable “vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and 
“fundamentally[un]fair.”233 
Dissenting from the application of harmless error review to coerced confessions, 
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens argued that the majority distorted 
precedent,234 created a dichotomy that did not work even for undisputed automatic 
                                                          
230 Ibid. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens joined the opinion written by Justice 
White in its entirety; Justice Scalia joined Parts I and II; and Justice Kennedy joined Parts 
I and IV. Ibid. As a result, different majorities of the Court found two things: (1) 
Fulminante’s confession was coerced; and (2) harmless error applied, but the admission 
of Fulminante’s confession was not harmless. See Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 75-76 & 
nn. 76-79; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2138; four justices thought the confession was 
coerced and that harmless error did not apply; four justices thought the confession was 
voluntary and that harmless error did apply; Justice Scalia agreed with the first four that 
the confession was coerced, but with the second four that harmless error applied; and 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the second four that the confession was voluntary, but, due 
to the lack of a majority on that point, agreed that under harmless error analysis, the error 
was not harmless. 
231 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08. 
232 Ibid., 309-10. 
233 Ibid., 310. 
234 For example, in Payne, the Court subjected a coerced confession to automatic reversal 
“regardless of the amount of other evidence” of guilt because the confession “vitiate[d] 
the judgment.” Ibid., 290 (dissent); citing Payne, 356 U.S. 560. (Emphasis supplied). 
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reversal errors such as a defective reasonable doubt instruction,235 and ignored that 
harmless error analysis requires consideration of “the nature of the right at issue and the 
effect of an error upon the trial.”236 They believed that admission of a coerced confession 
violates Due Process in a way that does not compare with other wrongfully admitted 
evidence because, not only is a jury unlikely to ignore it, it is so damaging that a jury 
might convict on its basis, alone.237 The dissent added that coerced confessions mandate 
automatic reversal because they may be “untrustworthy” and they “offend an underlying 
principle … of our criminal law [] that ours is an accusatorial process.”238 Allowing the 
police or the State to violate the law and wring a confession out of a defendant sacrifices 
“human values” and endangers the constitutional precept that no person shall be deprived 
of life or liberty without due process.239 The only point for which the dissenters, joined 
by Justice Kennedy, carried the day was in the majority holding that Fulminante’s 
coerced confession was not harmless because the State had not demonstrated that the 
confession’s admission did not contribute to the guilty verdict. They succeeded in 
overcoming the minority’s attempt simply to review the record for “overwhelming 
evidence” of guilt, apart from the constitutional error.240 
                                                          
235 Ibid., 291 (dissent); citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283, and explaining that a defective 
reasonable doubt instruction also occurs during trial and, yet, has been held to “distort[] 
the very structure of it because it creates the risk that the jury will convict … even if the 
State has not met its required burden of proof.” 
236 Ibid., 291 (dissent). 
237 Ibid., 292 (dissent). 
238 Ibid., 293 (dissent). 
239 Ibid., 293-94 (dissent). 
240 Compare ibid., 296, with ibid., 312. 
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While the majority’s holding in Fulminante has been roundly criticized,241 today, 
the reality is that most constitutional errors fall into the category of “trial” errors subject 
to harmless error review. The limited list of errors still deemed to be structural defects, 
and subject to automatic reversal, include: (1) deprivation of the right to counsel at 
trial;242 (2) lack of an impartial trial judge;243 (3) discrimination in the selection of grand 
or petit jurors;244 (4) violation of the right to self-representation at trial, to counsel of 
choice at trial, and to exercise autonomy over critical decisions made during trial;245 (5) 
an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction;246 and (6) denial of the right to a public 
trial.247 In recent years, however, the Court has clarified in ways favorable to defendants 
that Fulminante’s assessment of “trial” error versus “structural” defect is not all-
                                                          
241 See, e.g., Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 152; Fairfax, “Constitutional Harmless Error,” 
2039-51; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 527 & n. 162; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 
75-76, 101-08; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1180. 
242 Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.  
243 Tumey, 273 U.S. 510. In Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016), the Court 
reaffirmed that under the Due Process Clause, when an appellate judge had earlier, 
personal involvement in the defendant’s case, failure to recuse from reviewing the case 
on appeal constitutes structural error, even if the judge’s vote was not determinative to 
the ultimate appellate decision. 
244 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
245 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140 (2006); McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018). 
246 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 283. 
247 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). If, however, the defendant raises this issue in 
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, rather than by a 
contemporaneous trial objection and an issue for review on direct appeal, then the 
defendant must prove prejudice pursuant to the Strickland standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel or, perhaps, show proof of a fundamentally unfair trial. See Weaver 
v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017). On the facts presented in Weaver, the Court 
declined to address whether the latter option always exists because it did not find 
fundamental trial unfairness. Ibid., 1911. It also did not find an error under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which held that a defendant must demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Ibid., 687. 
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encompassing. Thus, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court rejected as “inflexible” any rule that 
“only those errors that always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and 
unreliable” are structural,248 as had been suggested in Fulminante. Instead, recent cases 
have stated that the reason a constitutional error is structural varies from error-to-error 
and, thus far, the Court has discerned three viable reasons that, either alone or in 
combination, can render an error structural:249 (1) if the error “cause[s] fundamental 
unfairness, “either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive undermining of 
the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial process,” in which case any State 
attempt to prove harmlessness will be futile;250 (2) if the “effect of the error is too 
difficult to measure or ascertain,” in which case any assessment of the error for 
harmlessness will be mere speculation;251 or (3) if the “right at issue is not designed to 
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,” 
in which case the issue of harm is irrelevant.”252 These recent Supreme Court decisions 
and their broader rationale inspire hope that, in the future, constitutional errors will be 
scrutinized more closely to ensure that the purposes for constitutional rights are honored 
                                                          
248 Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149-50 & n. 4 (emphasis original); ibid.; deprivation of 
the right to counsel of one’s choice was structural error because of “the difficulty in 
assessing how alternate counsel might have performed.” 
249 See Weaver, 137 S.Ct. at 1911-12; recapping these three purposes even though, there, 
the denial of a public trial for only a short time was not deemed structural error. 
250 See Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1909-10; failure of judge to recuse; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 
343–345; right to counsel; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279; erroneous reasonable-doubt 
instruction; Tumey, 273 U.S. 510; right to an impartial judge. 
251 See Vasquez, 474 U.S. 254; discrimination in selection of grand jurors; see also supra 
n. 248; also presenting unquantifiable errors. 
252 See McCoy, 138 S.Ct. at 1511; deprivation of right to autonomy to make critical 
decisions; Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149-50; deprivation of right to counsel of choice; 
McKaskle, 465 U.S. 168; denial of the right to self-representation.  
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and to prevent appellate “review” from reducing these rights to mere exceptions to the 





Chapter Four: Erosion of Constitutional Rights and Liberties 
 Up until now, however, the actual instances of courts finding a structural 
constitutional defects remain “exceedingly rare” and, in applying the harmless error test, 
they find the constitutional error to be harmless with “remarkable frequency.”253 The 
progression to this point largely reflects the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ manipulation 
of the constitutional criminal procedural rights established up to and during the Warren 
Court era.254 “In the case of fair trial rights, the[] … [Burger and] Rehnquist Court[s] 
assiduously preserved … landmark rulings [protecting rights] as a constitutional matter, 
while weakening the rights in an indirect way by limiting the remedies for their 
violation.”255 The Court did so in two primary ways: (1) by shifting the harmless error 
test to one of review for “overwhelming” untainted record evidence of guilt from 
                                                          
253 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793. 
254 The Warren Court ended in 1969, the same year Harrington was decided. 
255 Brandon L. Garrett, “Judging Innocence,” Columbia Law Review 108, no. 1 (2008): 
57 (emphasis supplied). See also Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2136, n. 120; “That a 
narrower reading of Chapman would prevail is unsurprising given the Court’s right-ward 
shift as the Warren Court became the Burger Court and, later, the Rehnquist Court;” 
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 503, n. 16; “Although the Burger Court did not 
overrule the Warren Court cases, it did effectively gut many of them through the 
extension of the harmless error rule;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 79-80; noting the “Burger and … Rehnquist Court’s increasingly 
widespread use of … harmless constitutional error” and view that it “presumptively 
applies to virtually all types of federal constitutional errors.” And see infra Pt. C; 
presenting my argument that such control by a group of nine justices over the individual 
rights of Americans is precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing 





Harrington forward;256 and (2) by limiting the class of structural defects subject to 
automatic reversal after Fulminante.257 
A. Invading the Province of the Jury 
 
That appellate courts too easily dismiss constitutional error results, in part, from 
their failure to recognize their proper role in our system of justice and their shifting of 
constitutional protections away from the defendant and in favor of the prosecution. As a 
consequence, rather than serving as the minimally-required rules for a fair criminal trial, 
constitutional rights have become the exception to a harmless error procedural doctrine 
that was designed to promote efficiency and finality.258 But criminal jury trials serve 
larger purposes for the defendant, including as the forum for (1) the jury to assess the 
evidence and make credibility calls in reaching its legal determination of guilt or 
                                                          
256 See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1358; By contrast, “[t]he 
Chapman test requires an examination of whether the error … possibly affected the 
decision of ‘at least one member of the jury.’” (Citation omitted). Saltzburg,” The Harm 
of Harmless Error,” 1014; “[B]ecause of the enormous burden of proof placed on the 
prosecutor …, a small showing of prejudice should suffice to convince an appellate court 
that an error during the course of the trial [is] reversible.” 
257 Two additional forms of limitation have also occurred: (1) dilution of certain 
constitutional rights by creating exceptions to their substantive application, such as in the 
area of search and seizure; see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); and (2) 
embedding a prejudice requirement into the elements of proving the violation of certain 
rights, such as with ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to disclose exculpatory 
information; see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668; Brady, 373 U.S. 83. Garrett, “Innocence, 
Harmless Error,” 57, 62 & n. 137, 129. These additional limitations are not discussed, in-
depth, in this thesis, but for further information, see Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 50-
55. 
258 See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; The harmless error doctrine has no 
“substantive doctrinal base.” It is an “appellate procedural doctrine which has caused 





innocence,259 (2) the community’s expression of values and common-sense through that 
jury determination, where the jury is free to engage in jury nullification260 or extend 
mercy,261 and (3) the public airing of disputes to educate the citizenry and ensure fairness 
and integrity in legal proceedings as a whole.262 A defendant who exercises the jury trial 
right expects to be judged by his peers, not by three legally-expert appellate judges who 
might be jaded by repeated encounters with convicted defendants.263 Indeed, in Duncan 
v. Louisiana,264 the Court recognized that the jury trial is a fundamental constitutional 
protection “against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, 
biased, or eccentric judge.”265 While later cases have held that the jury need not be made 
                                                          
259 See Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 513; The verdict of guilt or innocence is a 
legal one, not a factual one. A defendant may be found legally guilty when, in fact, he is 
innocent, and a defendant may be found legally innocent when, in fact, he is guilty.  
260 Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1356-57; “Substantive laws 
may be misguided, sentencing laws may be overly harsh, prosecutions may be selectively 
imposed, and judges may be biased. Citizens therefore rely on the common sense and 
mercy of a jury, through its nullification power, to keep both laws and government 
officials from working injustice.”  
261 Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 457; “A criminal conviction is not only 
a determination of guilt in fact; it is an establishment of legal guilt following settled 
procedural rules that are based on societal notions of fairness and on constitutional 
rights.” 
262 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n. 74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & nn. 112, 120. 
263 Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56 & n. 112; ibid., 
1369; “[T]he Constitution entitle[s] a criminal defendant to a fair ‘trial by jury,’ not a 
‘trial by appellate court;’” Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2056; “The jury 
provisions … reflect … a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over life and liberty of the 
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.” 
264 See Duncan, 391 U.S. 145. 
265 Ibid., 156; see also Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 2050; 






up of twelve people266 and the verdict need not necessarily be unanimous,267 the Court 
drew the line at anything less than a unanimous six-person jury268 and established that the 
Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury drawn from “a fair cross section of the 
community.”269 A panel of three appellate judges, who are legal experts, who encounter 
now-convicted appellants on a regular basis, and who do not witness the evidentiary case 
presentation but nonetheless weigh the factual record, thus falls short of the Court’s own 
recognized constitutional requirements.270  
Appellate courts should instead adhere to their appropriate roles, which include 
(1) error review and correction, (2) development of the law, and (3) supervision of trial 
court proceedings.271 Because the Constitution reserves to the individual the right to have 
a jury assess guilt or innocence and does not confer this authority on the courts,272 
appellate courts overstep their authority and invade the province of the jury when they 
                                                          
266 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
267 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
268 Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1970); Ballew v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 223 (1979). 
269 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); 
Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
270 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430-31; ibid; also noting that the defendant 
does not get to conduct voir dire to determine the fairness of the appellate judges or to 
present countervailing evidence in response to what the appellate judge might have in his 
or her mind; see Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2048-49; the appellate court is 
not reviewing to preserve the jury’s findings, but supplementing with non-findings of the 
jury; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1340; the “appellate court 
[is] reviewing the trial record to come to its own, independent conclusion of guilt.” 
271 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n. 74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1354-56. 
272 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (right to jury trial); U.S. Const. amend. VI (right to an 
impartial jury); U.S. Const. amend. X (the “powers not delegated to the United States” 





assume a fact-finding position in conducting harmless error review.273 By carving out the 
constitutional error and selectively viewing only the remaining, allegedly untainted, 
evidence, the appellate court makes a fresh determination of guilt, one based “upon facts 
which have never been considered by a jury and which, given [the appellate court’s] 
finding of guilt, never will be.”274 It must be remembered that if the government cannot 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that its constitutional violation did not prejudice the 
defendant’s rights, the result is a new trial, not an acquittal that sets the defendant free 
forever. The Harrington standard of “overwhelming” record evidence review places 
procedural efficiency and finality above the substantive right of the defendant to receive a 
constitutionally-fair trial by a jury, even though the result is merely a redo.275  
Shifting of the burden of proof and inferences drawn in favor of the government, 
on appeal, further impede the defendant’s basic fundamental right to a fair trial that is 
devoid of any constitutional error. In our accusatory system, a criminal defendant is 
presumed innocent unless the government establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for 
every element of the crime charged.276 The government must carry this burden of proof 
                                                          
273 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1193; the error is that “the wrong entity judge[s] the 
defendant’s guilt.” 
274 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430 & n. 67; ibid., 429, 427; The court “is 
sitting as an appellate jury,” when appellate courts are not supposed to “act as fact-finders 
for matters which must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt;” Chapel, “Irony of 
Harmless Error,” 515; fact-finding is not the appellate court’s role or purpose. See also 
infra nn. 286. 
275 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514; “any system that demands fairness in its 
proceedings but fails to provide for [it on] review mocks the concept of fairness.” 
276 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358; explaining that the standard of “proof beyond a 





by constitutionally-permitted means277 and the courts must label as foul any attempt by 
the government to do so in violation of constitutional rights. These premises are bedrock 
principles from which any jurist should start.   
The “overwhelming evidence” test for harmless error converts this fundamental 
constitutional framework using an alleged “no harm – no foul” theory278 and, by its 
application, has become a prosecutor-friendly test, in spite of criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights. The Court is certainly free to employ the more stringent Chapman 
standard for harmless error,279 but the malleability of the chosen test has tended to lead to 
a far higher percentage of affirmances using the Harrington test.280 “The administration 
                                                          
ensuring against unjust convictions. Ibid., 363. See also Chapel, “Irony of Harmless 
Error,” 511, 528; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2040. 
277 See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59; Constitutional errors allow 
jury consideration of cases that present incompetent evidence as if it were competent or 
that omit other, significant, competent evidence. In turn, the violation “biases the trial in 
favor of the state and denies the defendant due process;” ibid., 463-70; providing 
illustrative examples, such as wrongful appeal to jury passions and prejudices or 
comment on the defendant’s silence at trial, and explaining how they erode the 
presumption of innocence, lighten the government’s burden of proof, and create an unfair 
rebuttal burden of proof for the defendant. 
278 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 437. 
279 See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1360; “whereas the 
Chapman test requires harmless error review to be uniformly strict, requiring reversal if 
the error had any possible causal impact on the verdict, the [Harrington] test[] permits 
movement [to] a fairly lenient review of the record.” Mitchell notes that the test chosen 
often makes a difference to the case outcome. Ibid., 1335, 1338, 1347-51, 1363.  
280 Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 62; ibid., 17-18; the malleability of the harmless 
error test provides a “powerful tool” for a “result-driven court;” Greabe, “Riddle 
Revisited,” 100, nn. 223-24; judges usually care about the strength of the evidence of 
guilt rather than the standard employed to assess harmless error. See also Mitchell, 
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1347-50; conducting an informal survey of 
Westlaw cases and finding that federal courts are twice as likely to use the Harrington 
test than to use the Chapman test; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1215-28; surveying 53 





of the harm assessment test[] determine[s] the value of the rules that protect criminal 
defendants. If the defendant cannot obtain a remedy because the court finds a lack of 
harm, the right that was violated does not protect the defendant.”281 The “overwhelming 
evidence” harmless error test addresses neither the constitutional error nor the procedural 
impropriety of the government’s conduct; instead, it goes in search of other record 
evidence of guilt, without regard to the impact that the error or resulting government 
presentation may have had on the jury.282 As numerous commentators have noted,    
“[t]he Court apparently views the ultimate end of the criminal process and constitutional 
criminal procedure as securing the accused a fair trial. But, the Court has expressed a 
reductionistic notion of what a ‘fair trial’ means, defining it merely as a trial designed to 
produce a reliable verdict.”283 This “end-justifies-the-means” approach, which Congress 
rejected when it created the harmless error statute,284 leaves the fate of a citizen in the 
                                                          
voted to affirm convictions even more so than did prosecutors, and that most were 
persuaded based on “overwhelming evidence” that the defendant was, in fact, guilty. 
281 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 995 & n. 13. Poulin also notes that in one-third of the first 
200 cases wherein defendants were exonerated based on DNA evidence, the appellate 
courts previously had affirmed based on the harmless error test, finding “overwhelming 
evidence” of guilt, despite the defendants’ actual innocence. Ibid., 996. 
282 Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1340; “what a jury might 
have done in an error-free trial is irrelevant;” Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 396; 
“this ostensible concern with the question of guilt is not rationally tied to the reliability of 
the conviction.” 
283 Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 86; see also Murray, 
“A Contextual Approach,” 1794; finding most troubling “the dissonance between the 
modern harmless error doctrine’s reductionism and criminal procedure’s diverse 
normative ambitions.” 
284 The first proposed federal harmless error statute in 1908 effectively was a “correct 
result was reached” approach. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64. Congress 
rejected this approach in 1919 when, instead, it focused on the error and its effect on 





hands of a few, despite the Constitution’s clear construction to avoid this result.285 It is 
not the appellate court’s role to affirm a conviction based on its factual assessment that, 
putting aside the error, the record otherwise shows the government had a strong case of 
guilt.286 In effect, this test shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the 
constitutional error affected the jury’s verdict, when, constitutionally, the government 
bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.287  
Even worse, some appellate courts have collapsed the “overwhelming evidence” 
harmless error test into one of the mere sufficiency of the evidence, which represents no 
more than “the baseline requirement” the government must meet in order to obtain a 
conviction.288 The government also is assisted, at times, by the appellate courts’ tendency 
to view the record evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
                                                          
Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 
892, 992.  
285 Congress also was reticent, initially, to apply harmless error review to criminal trials 
out of concern that constitutional criminal procedure rights would be “too easily relaxed.” 
Dow and Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be Harmless,” 486, 484. 
286 See supra nn 126-30, 148-51 & accompanying text; quoting Bollenbach, Kotteakos, 
Bihn, and Chapman; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277; wherein the Court reconfirmed the proper 
roles of the jury and of the courts. See also Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 427; 
until the “overwhelming evidence” harmless error test, “no court had the power to enter a 
guilty verdict on its own judgment when the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial.” 
287 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1019-21, 1033. 
288 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1009; ibid, 1046; harmless error test should require “more 
than mere sufficient evidence;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 128; “the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that harmless error analysis is 
not a sufficiency of the evidence test.” But see, Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1187, Stacy 
and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 128-30, Anderson, “Revising 
Harmless Error,” 400; all noting that some courts find harmless error based merely on the 





prosecution.289 As a preliminary matter, this focus constitutes yet another invasion of the 
jury’s fact-finding role. Because jury deliberations occur in secret, involve the dynamic 
interaction of twelve different personalities, and result only in a general verdict of guilt or 
innocence, the appellate court cannot possibly know what evidence the jury credited, 
what inferences it accepted, or how it weighed the various pieces of evidence and 
inferences within the larger balance of the record.290 At best, the appellate court’s 
judgment “is based on its own probabilistic impressions of what a jury actually did,” 
which necessarily reflects its “own views of the weight and credibility of evidence.”291 
In addition, while viewing the record evidence and drawing all inferences in the 
government’s favor might be appropriate for a sufficiency of the evidence issue, the focus 
should work in the opposite direction for harmless error review.292 Under a sufficiency of 
                                                          
289 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1033; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1187 & n. 84; see Lee 
Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Boston: Harvard University Press, 
2013): 36; “The temptation is to view the record favorably to the verdict winner … and 
give short shrift to the defendant’s theories;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 127; the court may simply be inclined to assure itself that the 
defendant is, in fact, guilty; Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 175; if the court 
believes the defendant is likely to be convicted on retrial, it will tend not to reverse. 
290 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1187 & n. 84; citing Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 
28; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Gale Sutton-Barbere, and Peder Johnson, “Evaluating the 
Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on 
Juries?” Wisconsin Law Review 1983 (1983): 1152-53. 
291 Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 133, 127, 130; see 
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 516; the court “cannot possibly know or review what 
in the minds of the jurors led to the verdict;” Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate 
Activism,” 1358; the court is “hypothesiz[ing] a guilty verdict that was never in fact 
rendered.”  
292 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1048-52; see ibid., 1033; noting courts “find error harmless 
where the jury could convict if it drew the necessary inference in favor of the 





the evidence challenge, no constitutional error is alleged, the record is not susceptible to 
change, and the defendant simply claims that, based on a tangible and known record, the 
government failed to produce proof for every element of the crime charged. In this 
inquiry, the reviewing courts ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”293 They end their inquiry upon finding 
record evidence to support the elements and, therefore, the resulting jury verdict of guilt.  
By contrast, when a defendant alleges constitutional error, the record is not so 
tangible and known. Depending on the alleged error, for example, the record might be 
overinclusive because it contains evidence that should not have been admitted or 
underinclusive because it lacks evidence that should have been admitted. In short, from a 
constitutional standpoint, the record is not properly comprised. In this setting, where the 
error is a constitutional violation committed by the government, which bears the burden 
of proving harmlessness, the record should be viewed and all reasonable inferences 
drawn in favor of the defendant.294 Giving the government the benefit of the doubt, and 
viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the government’s favor, significantly 
                                                          
293 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
294 Compare Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; “The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that 
the damaging potential of the [error] were fully realized, a reviewing court might 
nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis 
supplied). See also Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1049-5; advocating “draw[ing] all 
inferences in favor of the defendant, giving weight to arguments that reframe the 





lightens the government’s burden of proof.295 And, by doing so based on a tenuous 
record, the appellate court merely speculates about what a jury might have done with a 
proper record, devoid of the constitutional violation. Because, as a bedrock principle, the 
government bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by 
constitutionally-permitted means, giving the government the benefit of all favorable 
evidence and inferences, when assessing constitutional error, compounds the 
constitutional injury. 
Notably, under both tests – sufficiency of the evidence and harmless error – 
appellate judges may not substitute their personal viewpoints for that of the jury.296 The 
difference, however, is that, for sufficiency of the evidence, the court looks at an 
untainted record to see if evidence exists to substantiate each criminal element; the court 
need not speculate beyond what is there, in the record. For harmless error, however, a 
constitutional violation taints the record, which, as a result, does not accurately reflect 
what the jury should have considered. The court’s focus on the limited portion of the 
record that it believes to be untainted does not solve the problem. The court should, 
instead, focus on the constitutional error and recognize “that the jury might have 
                                                          
295 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1048, review of the record in favor of the prosecution biases 
the court in favor of affirming the conviction; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 128; “This approach obviously does not adequately protect a 
defendant's right to a jury trial, for it presupposes that the jury did or will resolve all 
evidentiary conflicts in the prosecution's favor;” Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 
400; unlike the sufficiency of the evidence test, the harmless error test “requires no such 
deference to the state’s evidence.” 





developed a reasonable doubt or credited different evidence if the case [had been] tried 
without the [constitutional] flaw.”297  
B. Ill-Equipped to Perform Fact-Intensive, Retrospective Analyses 
 
An issue exists, however, regarding whether appellate judges are equipped to do 
so. As a preliminary matter, the cold, paper record on appeal, which some judges review 
only in part,298 is a poor substitute for the trial event, where the jury sees and hears all 
witness testimony and evidence, first hand. Jury decisions usually turn on credibility calls 
and witness demeanor. As Justice Traynor discusses, “age, sex, intelligence, experience, 
[and] occupation” all factor into credibility determinations.299 And only a person who 
actually experiences a witness’ examination can assess witness truthfulness. The written 
record on appeal does not reflect “the unreasonable pause, the inappropriate smile, the 
sarcasm that changes a ‘sure’ which means ‘yes’ to a ‘sure’ which means ‘I don’t believe 
                                                          
297 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1049; “Taking this approach, courts should not dismiss 
claims of harm simply because the government’s case is strong, the evidence in question 
is merely cumulative or impeaching, or the defense is unpersuasive to the court.” Poulin 
notes that this approach is particularly critical when the government’s case is purely 
circumstantial or the defense theory of the case might have been impacted by the error. 
Ibid., 1035-36. See also Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 400; courts should not 
ignore that often the “evidence is interrelated and likely tainted by the error.” 
298 D. Alex Winkelman et al., “An Empirical Method for Harmless Error,” Arizona State 
Law Journal 46 (2014): 1418; “[C]ommonly,” appellate judges review a truncated record 
comprised of “the trial court opinion, the litigants’ briefs, and memoranda from court 
clerks. While some appellate judges may actually review the raw trial court record, even 
then, the judges are a step removed from the live testimony of the real trial;” Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430; the record on appeal might not be accurate, complete, 
or reviewed in its entirety; accord Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2048-49. 
299 Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error,” 20-21; accord Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 





that’ or ‘I don’t agree;’”300 it does not reveal that “a witness answered some questions 
forthrightly but evaded others” or show that “a convincing and truthful answer in 
writ[ing] … sounded unreliable at [trial],” or “[a] well-phrased sentence in the record… 
[came across as] rehearsed,” or “[a] clumsy sentence [possessed] the ring of truth [when] 
the witness groped his way to its articulation.”301 And there is also the issue of 
contradictory witness testimony and evidence, where jurors must choose between 
competing versions of a story.302 Only the spectators of the trial presentation can assess 
what is true, half-true, or a lie. “There is a great risk that the appellate court will get it 
wrong” in its review of the “cold, antiseptic record.”303 
Several experts opine that appellate court fact-finding and evidence-weighing 
based on the cold, emotionless record fails to do justice and unconstitutionally violates 
due process and the right to confrontation.304 On appeal, a criminal defendant cannot 
offer new arguments, supplement the record with new evidence, or even, necessarily, 
answer the appellate judges’ concerns through oral argument. This lack of interaction is 
                                                          
300 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430; see also Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 
1193-94 & n. 110. 
301 Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error,” 20-21; accord Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 
1193-94 & n. 110. 
302 See Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059; “Jurors relate to each side of the case as a 
narrative story rather than an assembly of items of evidence.” 
303 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 530-31; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 
430; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1340.  
304 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 515; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 430; 
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2048-49; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 





particularly concerning. As the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers notes, oral 
argument has great value from a systemic perspective:  
[It] is the only time where a party and [his] advocate can interact with the 
decision-maker. It is a time when the court’s views on the issues are on 
display for the public and for [the parties], and counsel has the opportunity 
to address potential [record] misconceptions or overlooked facts. In that 
manner, oral argument is the most tangible manifestation of the critical 
role that appellate courts play in the resolution of public and private 
disputes traversing our legal system.305  
And yet, as the Academy points out in its Task Force Report and Initiative on 
Oral Argument, with the exception of the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, only about 22% of all federal appeals are granted oral argument before 
a panel of appellate judges;306 the remaining appeals are decided based on the parties’ 
briefs.307 Even more notably, of those appeals decided based on the briefs, some might be 
                                                          
305 James Martin and Susan Freeman, “Wither Oral Argument? The American Academy 
of Appellate Lawyers Say Let’s Resurrect It!” American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, 
August 14, 2017: 1, 
https://www.appellateacademy.org/publications/oral_argument_initiative.pdf. 
306 The District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits’ percentages are higher, 55% and 45% 
of all cases, respectively. American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, “Task Force Report 
and Initiative on Oral Argument,” American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, August 14, 
2017: 13, Table II, 
https://www.appellateacademy.org/publications/oral_argument_initiative.pdf. 
307 Ibid., 13 (Table II). The latest compilation of statistics from the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts, which is for the year of 2014, likewise shows that federal appellate 
courts grant oral argument in only about 20 % of all cases, a 50% decrease from the 





handled primarily by court staff attorneys, who draft decisions and present them to judges 
for their approval, and others might be handled primarily by a single judge, who 
circulates a draft decision electronically to the remaining two judges. Whether the judges 
always collaborate regarding the draft decision is uncertain. The Academy warns that this 
process “invites[s] a moral peril: a judge engaged in other matters may sign off on a 
trusted colleague’s draft without engaging in the case. And the third judge, unaware that 
the second judge did not engage, is at even greater risk of failing to engage after a draft 
has two votes.”308 These dangers further call into question the logic and legitimacy of 
harmless constitutional error review: a criminal defendant, who likely has no responsive 
input to the judges, but whose liberty hangs in the balance, is strapped to a static record, 
which is tainted with constitutional error, and based upon which, possibly, a sole judge, 
or even a staff attorney, primarily determines whether the jury would have found him 
guilty, anyway, despite the error.309 
Some commentators and empirical studies suggest that appellate judges do a 
“poor job” in performing this task.310 First, lay jurors and appellate judges do not process 
                                                          
arguments are losing ground in federal appeals courts; would ‘hot-court culture’ reverse 
trend?” American Bar Association Bar Journal, June 1, 2018,  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oral_arguments_are_losing_popularity_in_feder
al_appeals_courts_is_a_hot_cou/. 
308 American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, “Task Force Report,” 4-5. 
309 Contrast the English system, from which the American harmless error doctrine 
emerged, but which, unlike the American system, does allow open response to judges’ 
concerns and introduction of new evidence and arguments on appeal. Chapel, “Irony of 
Harmless Error,” 518, 531. 






cases in the same way. Lay jurors tend to relate to the parties’ presentations as if they are 
narrative stories, with even slight inferences sometimes proving to be powerful311 and 
jurors’ life experiences informing their assessments.312 The deliberative process further 
impacts the ultimate verdict. Citing numerous studies, the Supreme Court in Ballew v. 
Georgia explained that a jury of fewer than six jurors tends to lead to inaccurate and 
inconsistent verdicts because they do not fairly represent a cross-section of the 
community and often militate in favor of finding a defendant guilty.313 
As noted, appellate judges assessing harmless constitutional error do not 
necessarily engage in a robust deliberation in making their decision. Moreover, judges 
bring their own personal experiences, perspectives, and specialized legal training to the 
decision-making process, and they often fail to recognize that certain admitted evidence, 
omissions of evidence, or the interrelatedness of evidence might impact the record and 
                                                          
311 See Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059 & nn. 278, 280; noting that storytelling helps 
jurors organize the evidence and, at times, might make their credibility determinations 
appear less than objective; see also Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson, 
“Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1153, “‘Hundreds of different elements enter into a 
verdict – the education, associations, environment, family connections, religious 
convictions, social habits, prejudices, ambitions, and moral character of each juror, which 
must be multiplied by twelve for each panel.’” (Citation omitted). 
312 See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, “Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story 
Model for Juror Decision Making,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62, no. 
2 (1992): 189-206; noting that certain principles influence the jury’s acceptance of a 
story, including a story’s coverage, coherence, and uniqueness.   
313 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 229-34; citing numerous empirical and statistical studies and 
finding that deliberation by a smaller number of jurors increases “the risk of convicting 





the jurors’ decision in a different way.314 For example, errors relating to eyewitness 
misidentification, false confessions, flawed forensics, and biased jailhouse informants, 
can have a corrupting influence on the remaining evidence or an improperly bolstering 
effect,315 yet, routinely, these factors are overlooked when courts find the errors to be 
harmless.316 Similarly, evidence that appellate judges view as “merely cumulative or 
                                                          
314 Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 401; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 131; Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1059-60; Teitelbaum, Sutton-
Barbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1152-53. 
315 Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 397-400: Eyewitness misidentification can 
influence “subsequent identifications, and even confessions.” Ibid., 397. False 
confessions not only have a “devasting effect” on a jury, but “one confession may lead to 
a repetition, or a jailhouse informant’s claim that it was repeated.” Ibid., 398. Unvalidated 
or improper forensics, such as “bite mark identification, blood serology, [and] hair and 
fiber analysis,” may deprive a defendant of due process. Ibid., 399 & n. 55. And jailhouse 
snitches may have been offered a favorable deal by the government without their bias 
being revealed and requiring collateral challenge for introduction of “evidence outside 
the record.” Ibid., 399-400. See Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” iii-xiii; adding to the 
Anderson list: misinterpreted fingerprint evidence; flawed foot and tire print, voice, 
handwriting, ballistics, and arson analyses; contaminated DNA evidence; and 
manufactured or embellished false memories; Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 463-64; 
adding to the Anderson list: faulty scent analysis testimony by a dog handler. 
316 See, e.g., Garrett, “Judging Innocence,” 76-96; In his study of 200 wrongfully 
convicted defendants, Garrett found: (i) of the 28% wrongfully convicted defendants who 
raised witness misidentification, none of them prevailed, even though 78% of them were 
convicted, at least in part, based on mistaken identification; ibid., 76, 80; (ii) no 
defendant who challenged a false confession on direct appeal prevailed, although one was 
successful on collateral review based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; ibid., 
90, 96; and (iii) of 12 defendants who challenged informant testimony, only one 
prevailed. Ibid., 77, 86-87. See also Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” iv-vii; the National 
Registry of Exonerations shows that “mistaken eyewitness testimony was a factor in 
more than a third of wrongful conviction cases;” ibid., iv & n. 9; fingerprint evidence 
suffers from a “significant rate of error;” ibid., iv; “voice identification errors are as high 
as 64%,” “handwriting error rates average around 40% and sometimes approach 100%,” 
“error rates for bite marks run as high as 64%,” and “hair comparisons are about 12%;” 
ibid., iv-v; “wrongful convictions have been the result of faulty witness memories, often 
manipulated by the police or the prosecution; ibid., vii; and “between 2 and 8 percent of 





impeaching” may have reinforced the “coherence and persuasiveness” of the defendant’s 
case story in the eyes of the jurors.317 In one empirical study comparing lay person, 
lawyer, and judge behavior in reaction to numerous iterations of erroneously admitted or 
omitted evidence, the authors found sharply varying decision-making among the three 
groups, suggesting that the assessment of harmless error is highly subjective.318 They also 
uncovered that lawyers and judges often present with one of two mentalities, either pro-
prosecution or pro-defendant, and that this personal mentality influences harmless error 
outcomes.319 It leads to “a result-driven approach,” whereby a judge may pick the best 
articulation of the harmless error test to achieve a desired result.320 These subjective, 
even consciously-driven results led the study authors to conclude that harmless error 
analysis is a “speculative enterprise” and that many judges substitute their own 
viewpoints, with no real deference to the jury, let alone consideration of what the jury 
might have done, had the error not tainted the record.321  
                                                          
317 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1060; see also Pennington and Reid, “Explaining the 
Evidence,” 189-91; jurors will accept the story with the greatest coverage and coherence.  
318 Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1155, 
1160 
319 Ibid., 1173. 
320 Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1352; “Personal values may 
influence which test is chosen, with conviction-prone judges choosing the Harrington test 
because of its grant of greater discretion to review the record. Conversely, reversal-prone 
judges might choose the Chapman test because it calls for a very strict interpretation.” 
Accord Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 17-18; the malleability of the test chose 
provides a “powerful tool” for a “result-driven court;” Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 
1210-28; surveying 53 federal judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys regarding 
harmless error application and finding votes to affirm invariably came from prosecutors 
and judges, while votes to reverse came from defenders. 
321 Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1184, 





Further, psychological research shows that, in addition to being influenced by 
their conscious leanings and subjective viewpoints, appellate judges may labor under the 
effects of many subconscious biases, including hindsight bias, outcome bias, status quo 
bias, confirmation bias, and belief persistence. Hindsight bias predisposes appellate 
judges to look past the error and see a defendant as guilty based on the faulty belief that 
the past jury verdict signifies future predictability, even on retrial without the error.322 
Outcome bias similarly influences judges to view the jury’s initial, albeit error-affected, 
decision as correct, 323 and status quo biases reinforces this feeling, as the defendant no 
longer presents as presumed innocent but, instead, as a convicted felon.324 Confirmation 
bias bears more upon actual record review, reflecting the judge’s tendency to interpret 
and credit evidence in a way that supports the guilty verdict and discredit contradictory 
evidence and inferences.325 Belief persistence similarly causes judges to stick with an 
                                                          
revealed that wrongly-admitted evidence impacts jury verdicts, a defense objection to it, 
at trial, exacerbates the impact on verdicts, and jurors are not likely to heed judges’ 
limiting instructions to ignore wrongly-admitted evidence. 
322 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott, “The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,” Wisconsin Law Review 2006 (2006): 
317-22, 350; Jason M. Solomon, “Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can 
Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials,” Northwestern Law Review 99, no. 3 
(2005): 1086-87; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12, referring to 
these cognitive phenomena as “mental contamination.” 
323 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate 
Activism,” 1353; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 319-20; Winkelman 
et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12. 
324 Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411. 
325 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1039; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 
309; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411-12; adding that because 






initial assessment of guilt, resisting any change, even when undermining, erroneously-
excluded evidence becomes part of harmless error consideration.326 
Often, these cognitive biases go unrecognized while the judge’s subconscious 
mind tilts away from the harm and toward affirming guilt, despite knowledge of the 
error.327 And, even when the biases are recognized, they are difficult to resist.328 Several 
commentators posit that the ease of finding evidence supportive of guilt using the 
“overwhelming evidence” harmless error test is exacerbated by these biases.329 “The 
number of cases in which the court[s] characterize[] the prosecution evidence as 
overwhelming without careful scrutiny suggests biased review,”330 yet another negative 
facet of assessing, retrospectively, whether the error affected the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.331 
                                                          
326 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 
313-14; see also Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1411; referring to “belief 
persistence” as “coherence-based reasoning.” 
327 Findley and Scott, “Dimensions of Tunnel Vision,” 350; see Winkelman et al.; 
“Empirical Method,” 1411; “mental contamination” causes judges exposed to the error to 
make their views “cohere with that of the trial jury.” 
328 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 130-31.  
329 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; see also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 130-31; noting courts deem errors harmless if the evidence is 
“overwhelming,” even without assuring that the impacted evidence would not have 
changed the jurors’ minds; Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1412; “the very 
enterprise of after-the-fact review is doomed …. Judges simply cannot see the errors 
because psychological biases make it hard to imagine that cases would have come out 
differently.” 
330 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040 (emphasis supplied).  
331 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1040; see also Solomon, “Causing Constitutional Harm,” 
1067; Winkelman et al., “Empirical Method,” 1412; one study found that “less than 20% 
of the [judges’] analyses [even] used a test for determining harm,” and several studies 





C. Evading Appellate Courts’ Constitutional Roles 
 
Indeed, the disturbing trend among appellate courts not to give careful 
consideration to the constitutional error, but, instead, to move directly to harmless error 
analysis negatively impacts both the courts’ error review and law development roles.332 
At times, courts do not address the error at all or discard the error without analysis, 
stating something like “even if” or “assuming” a constitutional violation occurred, the 
error is harmless.333 This approach skirts the appellate courts’ role to analyze 
constitutional issues and provide guidance to the public, district courts, and prosecutorial 
and defense litigants.334 Written appellate decisions that interpret and explain 
                                                          
amend. VI; guaranteeing every criminal defendant the right to an impartial assessment of 
guilt or innocence. 
332 The appellate courts’ role in the judicial system is to review and correct error, interpret 
the law, and supervise trial proceedings. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 511-14 & n. 
74; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1354-56. 
333 See, e.g. Milton, 407 U.S. 371; “On the basis of the argument … and our examination 
of the extensive record …, we have concluded that the judgment … must be affirmed 
without reaching the merits of petitioner's present claim. Assuming, arguendo, that the 
challenged [confession] should have been excluded, the record clearly reveals that any 
error in its admission was harmless …,” ibid., 372; because the jury was otherwise 
presented with “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” we find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have reached the same verdict. Ibid., 377-78. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 
2187 (2015), “At issue here is Ayala’s claim that the ex parte portion of the Batson 
hearings violated the Federal Constitution.” Ibid., 2198; “[W]e find it unnecessary to 
decide that question.” Ibid., 2197; “Assuming without deciding that a federal 
constitutional error occurred, the error was harmless ….” Ibid., 2198. See Chapel, “Irony 
of Harmless Error,” 515, “by refusing to decide constitutional issues, courts “default[] in 
performing … the functions which justif[y] its existence.” 
334 Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38; this process allows the court to skip any 
consideration of the alleged error and affirm based solely on its harmless error factual 
assessment that the defendant is guilty, thus impeding the law-declaration function of 
appellate courts; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514-15; this process allows the court 
to avoid deciding hard issues of constitutional law; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak 





constitutional rights, along with the doctrine of stare decisis,335 provide stability in the 
law and notice so that individuals may guide their future actions.336 By shortcutting the 
appropriate order of analyses and assessing harmlessness as if it were the only issue, 
appellate courts fail to provide guidance that – had it been given – might obviate future 
constitutional violations and future appeals seeking to clarify the same constitutional 
claims.337 
Of course, in a nuanced way, the opposite result may be true. By developing a 
large body of jurisprudence based on the doctrine of harmless error, the Court has given a 
sort of negative guidance to the public, courts, and litigants that it will not enforce 
substantive constitutional rights or recognize the larger individual and institutional values 
that they protect. For example, when the Court in Harrington adopted the “overwhelming 
evidence” harmless error test, it implicitly telegraphed that a Bruton violation of the Sixth 
Amendment’s confrontation right does not matter if, in the court’s view, the defendant is, 
in fact, guilty. Thereafter, in later cases, the Court affirmed convictions using the same 
                                                          
335 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1824, n. 176, explaining stare decisis as a 
“‘hierarchy’ … under which ‘precedents … enjoy a super-strong presumption of 
correctness’” pursuant to the theory that “‘legislatures ‘remain[] free to alter’ judicial 
interpretations ….’” (Citations omitted). 
336 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 514-15; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1980-82.  
337 Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38-39, 51; see Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 
515; “If a court does not review alleged error, it provides no guidance for similar 
problems which may arise in the future, and it cannot correct error if it does not review 
claimed error;” Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; “What may be an important 
[constitutional] question … is therefore sidestepped by the application of a doctrine that 
itself presupposes the existence of such an error.” See also Goldberg, “Constitutional 






harmless error standard, despite Bruton violations in those cases.338 In this way, 
application of harmless error affects constitutional rights both affirmatively, by 
depreciating their value, and negatively, by failing to address them when violated.339 
Constitutional rights are lost in the balance. Under the Harrington test, courts look only 
to whether it believes the result is correct based on allegedly untainted factual evidence, 
without regard to how the constitutional error might have affected the defendant’s rights. 
The resulting body of harmless error jurisprudence then takes on a “quasi-
substantive” life of its own as trial judges, prosecutors, and investigative authorities 
operate within a system under which constitutional harms seem justified.340 Implicit 
within harmless constitutional analysis are the assumptions that: (1) “the state, in seeking 
to deprive the accused of his or her life or liberty, has violated its own rules, the same 
reason the accused was put on trial;” and (2) “[because] the error is deemed harmless[,] 
the state ought not to suffer any sanction for the violation.”341 In other words, it is okay 
                                                          
338 See Schneble, 405 U.S. 427; Brown, 411 U.S. 223.  
339 See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 435; When courts refuse “to decide a 
matter on the merits in favor of a procedural doctrine invented to avoid retrials over 
omitted ‘the’s,’ the loss is exceeded only by the danger of that same doctrine changing 
the constitutional process without warning.” 
340 Murray goes so far as to state “that stare decisis may prove to be a formidable 
obstacle to harmless error reform.” Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1823. He notes, 
however, that a way around this conundrum exists. The Supreme Court has held that 
“[u]nless inexorably commanded by statute, a procedural principle of [significant] 
importance should not be kept on the books in the name of stare decisis once it is proved 
to be unworkable in practice; the mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike 
from the perpetration of an unworkable rule are too great.” Ibid., 1825, n. 184 (citation 
omitted); see also ibid.; “stare decisis applies much more strongly to rights than to 
remedies.” (Citation omitted). 





for the police and prosecutors to commit and trial courts to approve a violation of the 
Constitution if, in an appellate court’s assessment, the defendant appears to be guilty 
anyway. And this premise further assumes that an appellate court is capable of making 
that factual assessment, which, for reasons previously discussed, is legally misplaced and 
realistically doubtful. One begins to wonder why, or perhaps how, the constitutional 
criminal rights contained in the Bill of Rights are still in existence. They have not been 
eliminated by the people, through constitutional amendment.342 Instead, they have been 
diluted by judicial fiat343 – itself a violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers344 
and the courts’ duty to protect and preserve the Constitution.345 Remarkably, an accepted 
understanding for the Bill of Rights includes protection against arbitrary rule by a few 
and government abuse of individuals when it so chooses.346 The Court’s creation of a 
“harmless constitutional error” doctrine thus turns the Constitution on its head on 
multiple levels. It fails to deter governmental abuse or to recognize that larger 
institutional values inform the Constitution’s provisions.347 
                                                          
342 See U.S. Const. art. V; requiring two-thirds of the House or State legislatures to 
propose an Amendment and ratification by three-fourths of the State legislatures.  
343 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. The power to create laws rests with Congress, not the 
courts. 
344 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47; a divided government was chosen to prevent 
“accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many.” 
345 U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; U.S. Const. art. VI.  
346 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 517; the courts have a responsibility to protect 
constitutional rights against abuses by the executive and legislative branches of the 
government and against oppressive majorities;” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 
433; constitutional rights are meant to be permanent and “immune to the political process.” 
347 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; harmless error erodes constitutional rights and 





i. Failure to Deter Abuse by Those in Power 
 
Harmless constitutional error that focuses on the weight of the evidence takes no 
stock of the propriety of government actors’ conduct.348 Instead, the more impactful 
harmless error becomes in relation to a particular constitutional violation, the greater its 
directive power over the behavior of police, prosecutors, and inferior courts.349 Knowing 
that a violation likely will not result in a conviction reversal, the police see little risk, for 
example, in obtaining evidence illegally, forcing a defendant’s confession, or 
manipulating testimony or evidence at trial.350 For the same reason, prosecutors have 
                                                          
harmless error has “two pernicious effects”: (1) discouraging adherence to the rules, and 
(2) systematic erosion of justice. See also Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate 
Activism,” 1366; the Harrington standard does not deter official misbehavior and 
reinforces government error and abuse. 
348 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 995, n. 13; Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 38, 57-59; 
Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 468-70. 
349 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 436-37 & n. 142; “[I]f a particular error is 
declared to be harmless a sufficient number of times, then the cumulative effect of such 
holdings will be that both the prosecution and the trial judge will tend to ignore error and 
commit it again;” Albert W. Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial 
Judges,” Texas Law Review 50 (1972): 662; affirmances on harmless error grounds 
“might be misread” by police and prosecutors as “evidence of the court’s willingness to 
tolerate” error or even as “winking at lawlessness.” 
350 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 439. See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-
96; citing examples of coerced confessions and unlawful searches and seizures that go 
uncorrected and, therefore, embolden the police to violate the law. See also Garrett, 61; 
“The message to law enforcement officers is that unconstitutional ends justify the means 
to obtain evidence of guilt;” Kozinski, x & n. 49; “[t]he Justice Department and FBI [] 
formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave 
flawed testimony in almost all [of the 268] trials in which they offered evidence against 
criminal defendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000.” See, e.g., ibid, xi; 
citing the 2013 release of a death row inmate convicted based on a supposed oral 
confession that was fabricated by Detective Saldate, “a serial liar,” and citing a second 
case where a defendant spent 39 years in jail based on a twelve-year-old boy’s eyewitness 





little incentive to avoid use of that evidence at trial351 or to refrain from committing their 
own constitutional errors, such as commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify or 
withholding exculpatory evidence.352 Even the prosecutor’s dual role “to seek justice” 
has been massaged to be compatible with these actions.353 Weak court enforcement of 
constitutional obligations emboldens these state actors because they interpret judicial 
nonintervention as judicial approval. 
Thus, police, prosecutors, and courts watch carefully as a constitutionally-harmful 
body of harmless error jurisprudence develops. The existence of this jurisprudence 
permits police and prosecutors to view certain constitutional violations as legally 
                                                          
351 See Fish, “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” 297-298; arguing that prosecutors should 
instead serve a gatekeeping role to prevent the use of dubious evidence. 
352 See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59, 463-70; demonstrating how 
these errors allow jury consideration of cases that present incompetent evidence as if it 
were competent or that omit other, significant competent evidence, thereby biasing the 
case in favor of the government and eroding defendants’ presumption of innocence. See 
also Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 61; “The message to prosecutors is that, if 
there is some other reliable evidence of guilt, even a constitutional violation may be 
excused.” See Kozinski, xxii-xxiii; “[T]here are disturbing indications that a non-trivial 
number of prosecutors – and sometimes entire prosecutorial offices – engage in 
misconduct … rang[ing] from misleading the jury, to outright lying in court and tacitly 
acquiescing or actively participating in the presentation of false evidence by police.” 
Ibid., xxii-xxiii.  
353 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 438-39; “[T]he prosecutor’s duty to ‘justice,’ 
may raise some doubt about how he should respond to a constitutional violation, but the 
prosecutor’s instincts as a lawyer combined with the harmless constitutional error 
doctrine, demand that the prosecutor abdicate any role as a positive force for the 
maintenance of constitutional guarantees;” Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 
459; “Although the duty of the prosecutor is ‘to seek justice, not merely to convict,’ the 
adversarial system demands aggressive advocacy to the limits of law.” (Citation omitted). 
But see Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 468; “[L]eaving prosecutors to decide for 
themselves what it means to ‘seek justice’ in any given situation is a doomed regulatory 
strategy;” The Federalist No. 80: “No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, 





acceptable and compels trial and intermediate appellate courts to find them acceptable 
virtually in the same breath that they may disapprove of them.354 As a result, government 
actors are vested with discretion355 to disregard the law, even to violate it deliberately.356 
Indeed, numerous reviews have documented just how frequently prosecutors do engage 
in such actions. In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity reviewed almost 12,000, post-
1970 cases and found that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in more than 2,000 of 
them.357 Over time, the results have not improved. Tellingly, in 2016, the Innocence 
Project drew direct connections between confirmed cases of prosecutorial misconduct, 
                                                          
354 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 437-38, 439 & nn. 157-58; because they are 
compelled by binding precedent to so do, “the court[s] [keep] affirming and the 
prosecutors [keep] [committing violations];” Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195; we can 
hardly expect prosecutors to respect the rights of criminal defendants … when we as 
judges are unwilling to do so;” Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 458-59; 
“Appellate court expressions of disapproval and warnings of impropriety provide little 
deterrence if convictions resulting from error-tainted trials are allowed to stand.”  
355 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1796. Murray extends this unlimited license to the 
courts and structural rights, arguing that “remedial deterrence” motivates courts to 
construct the right in such a way as to avoid the consequence of an automatic reversal. 
Ibid., 1810 & n. 107. 
356 See Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct,” 631, 645-47; despite judicial condemnation 
of prosecutorial misconduct, it continues; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 
458-59 & n. 8; academic commentators “bemoan[] [the] frequency” of prosecutorial 
misconduct;” Rachel E. Barkow, “Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office,” 
Cardozo Law Review 31, no 6 (2010): 2090; prosecutorial misconduct “is not an 
infrequent occurrence.” See also Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 86; “the current 
system of harmless error does not provide prosecutors incentives either to educate 
themselves on the law or to shy away from intentional or knowing misconduct;” 
Kozinski, xxxviii; “Faced with the remote possibility of being found out, and the 
likelihood that nothing bad will happen even if they are, many prosecutors will turn a 
blind eye or worse.” 
357 Brook Williams, “Methodology: The Team for Harmful Error,” last modified May 19, 
2014, Center for Public Integrity, https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/methodology-
the-team-for-harmful-error/. In addition, concurring or dissenting judges found 





harmless error determinations, and discipline of prosecutors for their actions: of 660 
cases of confirmed prosecutorial misconduct between 2004-2008, 527 cases were 
affirmed based on harmless error review and only one prosecutor was disciplined.358 
Courts should hold legal authorities accountable for wrongful behavior.359 In 
those cases where courts have done so, defendants’ rights were vindicated even while 
government actors continued to refuse to acknowledge their misconduct.360 But the courts 
do not take action often enough. And the Supreme Court, rather than exhorting them to 
do so, has recognized absolute immunity for prosecutorial actions taken while in the role 
of prosecutor and relegated enforcement of the law, against those obligated to uphold the 
law, largely to other remedies.361 As a review of recent research demonstrates, these 
                                                          
358 Innocence Project, “Prosecutorial Oversight: A National Dialogue in the Wake of 
Connick v. Thompson,” The Innocence Project. March 2016, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IP-Prosecutorial-
Oversight-Report_09.pdf. 
359 See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 470; “The [c]ourts themselves are 
instruments of law enforcement [and] [t]hey must preserve their own integrity;” 
Kozinski, xxxiii; “[J]udges have an affirmative duty to ensure fairness and justice, 
because they are the only ones who can force prosecutors and their investigators and 
experts to comply with due process.” 
360 See Kozinski, xxiii-xxvi; highlighting three cases where, despite being caught red-
handed, prosecutors continued to resist acknowledging their misconduct until forced to 
do so by district judge intervention or investigations. In the first case, the court ordered 
an investigation that forced the Justice Department to admit its wrongdoing and move to 
vacate the conviction. Ibid., xxiv. In the second case, the Ninth Circuit vacated a 
conviction and, on remand, a State appellate court barred a retrial; still, the district 
attorney complained about the courts’ actions. Ibid., xxv. In the third case, a court 
disqualified an entire prosecutor’s office from further participation in the case based on 
its manufacture of false confessions. Ibid., xxvi. 
361 The Court has suggested that the following mechanisms will cause prosecutors to 
comply with their constitutional duties: discipline by state bar associations, civil liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contempt of court, and criminal liability. See Connick v. 





remedies are rarely enforced and do not deter constitutional violations.362 Indeed, 
prosecutor lobbying bars resist criminal justice reforms designed to hold them more 
accountable. Paradoxically, many of the arguments they give equally underscore the 
flaws in the harmless error doctrine that they use to support convictions:363 
Rules governing prosecutorial 
conduct cannot take into account 
“how prosecutors should behave in 
a given situation;” “prosecutors’ 
conduct is too complicated to be 
dictated by enforceable rules” 
Harmless error cannot take into 
account what a jury would have 
done in a given situation devoid of 
constitutional error; jury conduct is 
too complex to analyze by use of 
the harmless error doctrine 
Rules governing prosecutors’ 
conduct “usurp” the role of the 
legislature 
The harmless error doctrine usurps 
the role of the people, both by 
weakening constitutional rights and 
invading the jury’s role 
                                                          
362 The ineffectiveness of these “checks” on deterring police or prosecutorial misconduct 
is well-documented. See, e.g., The Innocence Project, “Prosecutorial Oversight,”12-20; 
Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 79-84; Alschuler, “Courtroom Misconduct,” 674; 
Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 475; Barkow, “Organizational Guidelines,” 
2090, 2093-98; Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 474-78; Fish, “Prosecutorial 
Constitutionalism,” 254-59; Keenan, et al., “The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability,” 
234-40; Ellen Yaroshefsky, “Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously,” University of the District of Columbia Law Review 8 (2004): 288. 
 Studies and news reports support these scholars’ views. See Ridolfi, Possley, and 
North California Innocence Project, “Preventable Error,” 3; Of more than 4,000 appellate 
decisions surveyed, the court found prosecutorial misconduct is almost one-fifth (707) 
cases, but only seven prosecutors were disciplined; Armstrong and Possley, “The 
Verdict;” finding more than 11,000 homicide cases involving prosecutorial misconduct 
between 1963 and 1999, without a single one resulting in a prosecutor’s public sanction 
and only two prosecutors suffering short term suspensions; Brad Heath and Kevin 
McCoy, “Prosecuting Offices’ Immunity Tested,” USA Today (McLean, VA), Oct. 6, 
2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/Washington/judicial/2010-10-05-federal-
prosecutor-immunity_N.htm; finding 201 prosecutorial ethics violations between 1997-
2010, with only one prosecutor sanctioned. See also Joel B. Rudin, “The Supreme Court 
Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or The Bar: Three Case 
Studies That Prove That Assumption Wrong,” Fordham Law Review 80, no. 2 (2011): 
539-41; finding rampant prosecutorial misconduct in the New York boroughs. 
363 See Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 480-83; the source for all prosecutor argument 





Rule-makers have been “captured 
by the defense bar” 
The courts have been captured by 
their use of harmless error 
Ethics rules will lead to “frivolous 
and oppressive disciplinary 
complaints” and a resulting waste 
of “prosecutor’s time and 
intrus[ion] into the[ir] 
confidential” decision-making 
Harmless error has moved beyond 
mere technicalities and minutiae, 
leading to time-consuming 
litigation about constitutional errors 
and review of the “overwhelming” 
record evidence, despite the jury’s 
role as confidential fact-finder 
“[H]eightened risk of discipline … 
will make prosecutors overly 
cautious, impeding their 
effectiveness” 
Harmless error will allow 
prosecutors to violate the law to 
obtain convictions, regardless of the 
impact on defendants’ rights 
Defendants will take advantage of 
the rules, “potentially creating 
new, unintended legal rights” 
Prosecutors will take advantage of 
harmless error, in spite of the 
existence of constitutional rights 
“[N]orms governing prosecutors 
are uncertain and contested,” and 
as “elected or appointed” members 
of a “democratic process,” they 
should be “subject to political 
accountability, not judicial 
oversight” 
All power not granted to the 
government rests with the people, 
and the courts are accountable to 
uphold the people’s constitutional 
rights rather than negating them 
through harmless error oversight  
Ethics rules are “over-inclusive” 
and might “be interpreted to forbid 
conduct that does not deserve to be 
punished” 
Harmless error can be interpreted to 
punish innocent defendants while, 
simultaneously, not punishing 
government constitutional 
violations 
Conduct rules are “invariably 
uncertain,” resulting in 
“confus[ion] for prosecutors” 
Harmless error makes the meaning 
of constitutional rights uncertain, 
failing to given guidance to the 
public, courts, or litigants 
Conduct rules are “unnecessary” 
because no “widespread” 
prosecutorial misconduct exists 
and “[s]ingling out prosecutors” 
would be “unfair” and 
“demoralizing”  
Constitutional rights serve as 
protection against government 
abuse, and distorting these rights to 
obtain convictions is unfair to the 







In sum, government actors do not appear to want judicial oversight; they want to 
call their own shots.364 But courts are obligated to cleanse the system of constitutional 
errors, not to perpetuate violations or, worse, turn them into tools to be used against 
defendants.365 The harmless error doctrine has gone from closing reversal loopholes 
created by mere technicalities, minutia, or defense inserted-minor errors, to allowing 
police and prosecutors to commit and insert constitutional errors into the record for jury 
consideration, with little-to-no ramifications. The Court has distorted the doctrine 180-
degrees from its purpose, and any judicial economy and finality achieved by its 
application simply cannot sustain the harm done to individual and institutional 
constitutional values.366 
ii. Failure to Protect Individual and Institutional Values  
 
Several commentators have suggested that the harmless error doctrine no longer 
serves its goals of economy, finality, and pragmatism. 367 Appellate courts now spend 
                                                          
364 Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 480; “The thirty-year review of prosecutorial ethics is 
largely a story about federal prosecutors’ obstruction of ethics regulation at every turn.” 
365 See Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 176; “If the appellate court reverses a 
conviction when error occurs, a prosecutor will have a greater incentive both to refrain 
from committing intentional and deliberate errors and to invest resources in preventing 
inadvertent errors from occurring than if the court, invoking the harmless error rule, 
declines to reverse;” Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 467; additional rules governing 
prosecutors’ conduct and stricter enforcement of existing rules are needed. 
366 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 540; “courts [are what] stand between citizens and 
a police state;” Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 62; harmless error “undermines 
precisely those rights designed to prevent the wrongful conviction of the innocent.” 
367 See Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2060-65; Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 455-
56; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 440-41; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 






exorbitant resources on record review for “overwhelming evidence” of factual guilt, 
which is an inefficient use of court time and inconsistent with its systemic purpose.368 
Harmless error also does not necessarily lessen the number of court proceedings or more 
quickly bring matters to conclusion. For example, constitutional errors that allow use of 
evidence that the prosecution otherwise would not have obtained, permit a trial to occur 
that might not otherwise have happened, followed by an appeal from that trial, and 
substantial time invested in that appellate review.369 And, if the error ultimately is not 
harmless, yet a second trial and, likely, a second appeal will occur for a case that the 
prosecutor should not have brought in the first place.370 The harmless error doctrine, thus, 
increases both the number of criminal trials and appeals. If appellate courts would more 
frequently enforce constitutional rights, rather than accepting their breach, multiple stages 
of litigation could be avoided.371 In addition, actually addressing constitutional errors, 
rather than moving directly to harmless error review, would lighten appellate court 
caseload “by laying down clear rules of law to guide prosecutors, defense counsel and 
trial courts” for both current and future cases.372 By contrast, “too lax a standard of 
harmlessness … reduc[es] the cost to prosecutors of errors, increase[s] the number of 
                                                          
368 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 515; “To pursue such a course in order to 
determine whether error is harmless, so that judicial economy might be served is not only 
ironic, it is nonsensical;” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441; highlighting “the 
increase in court time spent on [review] due to the ‘overwhelming evidence’ harmless 
error test.” 
369 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 440. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid., 441; “As a corollary, suppression of a right increases the number of trials, which 
will be followed by an appeal.” 





errors and hence the number of appeals and the number of issues per appeal ….”373 
Finally, as a practical matter, an original problem of defense attorneys inserting minor 
technical errors into the record to trigger auto-reversal is simply inapplicable for 
constitutional errors. “It is difficult [for defense counsel] to place a bad search, a bad 
statement, a bad lineup, or other [government-controlled] error into the record.”374 
Nor does harmless constitutional error necessarily serve its additional goals of 
ensuring fairness and public confidence in the justice system.375 Once the Court whittled 
the criminal trial’s central purpose to assessing factual guilt or innocence,376 it reduced 
review of constitutional errors to their truth-seeking function and the reliability of the 
trial result.377 But the reliability of the trial result cannot be presumed based on a review 
of the untainted “overwhelming evidence.” As previously discussed, constitutional errors 
affect the body of evidence that the jury considered and the jury might have “developed a 
reasonable doubt or credited different evidence”378 had the error not occurred.379 The last 
three decades of DNA exonerations prove that the harmless error “overwhelming 
                                                          
373 Ibid. 
374 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441. 
375 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2065; Anderson, “Revising Harmless 
Error,” 396-400. See also Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 466-67. 
376 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681; Rose, 478 U.S. at 578-79. 
377 See Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 86-87; harmless 
constitutional error “presumes the reliability of the result and judicial economy to be the 
only values relevant to deciding the appropriate remedy for constitutional error; 
(emphasis original);” Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432; harmless 
constitutional error effectively says that all other interests are outweighed by the 
nonconstitutional value of judicial economy. 
378 Poulin, “Tests for Harm,” 1049. 





evidence” test “is not rationally tied to the reliability of convictions” because it is not 
conducted with “an awareness of the contributors to wrongful conviction[s].”380 And 
these exonerations stand as proof of criminal justice gone awry at times, with a resulting 
loss of public confidence in the system.381 
Harmless constitutional error also trades individual and institutional protections 
for the goal of punishing a presumably guilty defendant. The doctrine’s emphasis on the 
trial result stands in stark contrast to the Constitution’s “broader ethical vision, which 
encompasses a diverse array of ‘non-truth-furthering’ interests … in addition to ‘truth-
furthering’ objectives.’”382 These non-truth furthering interests serve as proxies for larger 
societal values. Thus, the Constitution espouses broad ideals of individual autonomy and 
dignity by resting primary power with the people,383 limiting and separating the powers 
                                                          
380 Anderson, “Revising Harmless Error,” 396, 401; citing to the Innocence Project, 
Anderson explains that “[w]ith the number of DNA exonerees …, it is no longer possible 
to ignore the possibility of wrongful convictions;” John Paul Stevens, “Justice Stevens 
Criticizes Election of Judges,” Washington Post, August 4, 1996, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-stat/sitemaps/archive-23.xml; “The recent 
development of reliable scientific evidentiary methods has made it possible to establish 
conclusively that a disturbing number of persons who had been sentenced to death were 
actually innocent.” 
381 Green, “Prosecutorial Ethics,” 462; noting “public disillusionment” as a result of 
wrongful convictions; see also Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2065; the care 
taken to ensure due process will encourage public confidence in the system. 
382 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. See also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 94; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516, 
532-33; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1366; Bilaisis, “Abettor 
of Courtroom Misconduct,” 457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2052-54. 
383 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 516, 





of the government,384 and protecting against unfair and abusive government actors or 
majoritarian control.385 The Constitution cements the right to a public trial before an 
impartial jury of one’s peers386 to ensure not only fairness, but also the expression of 
community values, education of the public, and transparency and confidence in the 
criminal justice system.387 And, the Constitution provides the rights to privacy,388 to 
confront and compel witnesses, to legal representation, and against self-incrimination to 
promote both the truth-furthering function of verdict reliability and the non-truth-
furthering goals of fairness and protection from government abuse.389  
Any doctrine of harmless constitutional error that analyzes only truth-furthering 
interests, to the extent it reliably can do so,390 but neglects non-truth-furthering concerns, 
                                                          
384 See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, III. See also U.S. Const. art. V; providing the process 
whereby the people retain control over any amendments to the Constitution. 
385 U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, XIV. See Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 457-58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1194-95; Goldberg, “Constitutional 
Sneak Thief,” 432; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 508-10, 533; Fairfax, “Harmless 
Constitutional Error,” 2053-56; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 
1356. 
386 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
387 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13, 1821; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 457-58; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-56; Mitchell, 
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1355-56; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless 
Error,” 536-39; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-96; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-
80. 
388 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is 
Human,” 1197-98; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-80. 
389 U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV; Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct,” 457-
58; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195; Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432-33; 
Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510. Murray creates a third category of “truth-
obstructing” objectives, which he states the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments also 
serve. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13; see also Stacy and Dayton, 
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 89, 110-13. 





ignores the Constitution’s complex structure and degrades those constitutional 
protections that promote larger societal values.391 “The Constitution does not create a 
hierarchy of rights or values,” and there is no “reason to suppose that the framers 
intended rights having truth-furthering purposes to carry more weight than rights having 
other purposes.”392 Instead, the Constitution aims to preserve and protect individual and 
institutional rights against “contrary claims of necessity by the government,”393 such as 
those interests that are allegedly promoted by harmless constitutional error review.  
                                                          
391 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1813, 1799; see also Stacy and Dayton, 
“Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80-81; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 
532; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1366. 
392 Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 90. See also Murray, 
“A Contextual Approach,” 1813; the Constitution’s “normative structure” “belie[s] the 
notion that the pursuit of truth – or any other single value – constitutes criminal 
procedure’s overarching ‘thrust.’”  
393 Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432. 
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Chapter Five: Possible Solutions to the Harmfulness of Harmless Error Review 
For decades, scholars have grappled with a harmless error doctrine that has 
expanded beyond its purposes to infringe constitutional protections. Most commentators 
agree that the Harrington test, which disregards the constitutional error in search of other 
record evidence of overwhelming guilt, is wrong as a matter of law.394 This test also, 
simultaneously, permits those whom we entrust with enforcing the law, such as police 
and prosecutors, to violate constitutional protections with little-to-no ramifications.395 
Proposed solutions to these dilemmas, however, have not proven to be any more 
determinate,396 and few of them get any closer to the original intent of the harmless error 
statute.397 Some scholars have continued to argue that harmless error review was never 
intended apply to constitutional violations.398 But this position was rejected by the Court 
                                                          
394 See supra Ch. 4. See also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; “For federal constitutional 
violations, “[the government must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
[constitutional] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict,” and “the court 
must be able to declare a belief that [the constitutional error] was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied). 
395 See supra Ch. 4, Pt. C(i). 
396 See infra Pts. A and B. 
397 Ibid. There are some exceptions, however, including the proposals of Justice Traynor, 
Chief Judge Chapel, and Professor Greabe, who advocate a rights-based approach tied to 
28 U.S.C. § 2111, with which I agree. See infra nn. 419-50 & accompanying text. 
398 See Goldberg, “Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 441-42; “The Court should adopt a rule 
of automatic reversal, fulfill its function with respect to the Constitution, and make its 
judgments in full light of the undiluted effect of the rules it makes;” Wicht, “No Such 
Thing as Harmless Constitutional Error,” 109; “[T]he current rule undermines the 
inherent value of constitutional rights;” Dow and Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be 
Harmless,” 503-04; Advocating automatic reversal because the harmless error 
counterfactual (i.e., had the error not occurred, the result would have been the same) is 
not subject to “empirical verification” and, as a result, is “logically impossible.” Compare 
Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2031; advocating that that “any error that 
wholly subverts the institutional role of the jury should be subject to automatic reversal.”  
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in Chapman399 and the harmless error statute, itself, draws no distinction between 
constitutional and non-constitutional violations.400 The statute’s history also shows that 
Congress considered whether applying harmless error to criminal trials might allow 
constitutional criminal procedural rights to be “too easily relaxed”401 and, still, it focused 
the statute on “substantial rights,” without isolating constitutional from non-constitutional 
errors.402  
Given the expansion of harmless error to reach most constitutional rights over the 
last half-century, other scholars have offered different solutions based on the assumption 
that the doctrine has become too ubiquitous to reject it403 and the fear that too strict of a 
rule might encourage courts to define constitutional rights narrowly.404 Their proposals 
range from advocating a return to the strict Chapman standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not impact the verdict,405 to a rights-based approach 
                                                          
399 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21–22; “We decline to adopt any such rule.” 
400 See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; see also infra n. 431. 
401 Dow and Rytting, “Can Constitutional Error be Harmless,” 486, 484. 
402 In conducting constitutional and statutory interpretation, the Court must begin with the 
text. Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts (Eagan, MN: West Publishing Company, 2012), 56. 
403 See Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1339 & n. 23; noting that 
Goldberg’s position is well-founded, but believing that harmless error review is here to 
stay, as that “the Court has not once [re]considered the validity of the doctrine.” 
404 See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; describing such narrowing as “a kind of 
backhanded use of the harmless-error rule;” Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810 & 
n. 107; arguing that “remedial deterrence” motivates courts to construct the right in such 
a way as to avoid the consequence of an automatic reversal; see also Traynor, Riddle of 
Harmless Error, 43; if the test is too stringent, it will invite courts “to give [it] lip service 
while tacitly discounting it;” accord Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533; if the test is 
too lax, it will lead to automatic affirmances and violations of rights.  
405 See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1199-1209; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1364-69. 
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that focuses on the substantial right violated per § 2111,406 to a remedy-based, contextual 
approach that takes into account the truth-seeking and non-truth-seeking functions of the 
constitutional right,407 and, finally, to what may be considered a violation-based 
approach, which incorporates harm as an element into the analysis of whether a 
constitutional error occurred at all.408 While each proposal offers a unique solution for the 
malleability that has come to dominate harmless error review, at times they do overlap, 
and they all unite in their rejection of the Harrington “overwhelming evidence” harmless 
error test. But this rejection does not mean that other record evidence should be ignored. 
As the following proposals show, the record provides the context for assessing the 
alleged constitutional harm under most of these proposed tests. 
A. Chapman’s Focus on the Verdict versus Section 2111’s Focus on Rights 
The proponents of the Chapman standard draw much for the Court’s explanation 
of it in Sullivan409 and stress that only this single, strict test will protect constitutional 
rights while serving the purposes of harmless error review.410 The proper focus, they 
argue, is on what the actual jury considered, including the error, not what a different, 
hypothetical jury might decide, absent one.411 The error, moreover, must be placed in the 
                                                          
406 See Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533-40; Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 
42-51; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 116-19. 
407 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810-20; Stacy and Dayton; “Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98. 
408 See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63. The term “violation-based approach” is my 
own, and should not be attributed to Professor Epps. 
409 Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275. 
410 See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1175, believing that the broad harmless error statute 
does not offer sufficient guidance on what errors demand reversal. 
411 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1200-01; citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275; Mitchell, 
“Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1368; same. 
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context of the entire record, with appellate judges asking whether the error (1) involved a 
“central issue in the case,” (2) “significantly undermine[d] the untainted evidence,” (3) 
provided a “crucial link in the government’s case,” (4) “adversely affect[ed]” the 
defendant’s ability “to present his case,” or (5) “shift[ed] the burden of proof from the 
government to the defendant.”412  
For example, coerced confessions and erroneous jury instructions that omit or 
seriously misstate a criminal element likely cannot be found beyond a reasonable doubt 
not to have affected the jury under these criteria.413 In the first instance, little evidence 
presented to a jury can be more damaging to a defendant’s claim of innocence than a 
confession.414 In the second instance, because the jury failed to decide a critical element, 
no actual verdict exists on which to conduct harmless error review.415 In these scenarios, 
while the Harrington harmless error test would lead to affirmance if other, overwhelming 
evidence of guilt exists, Chapman’s test would not. By contrast, when erroneously 
admitted evidence is insignificant, but other overwhelming evidence of guilt does not 
exist, Harrington would require reversal while Chapman would not.416 These sample 
                                                          
412 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206. Compare Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere, and 
Johnson, “Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect,” 1181; in inquiring into the actual jury’s 
state of mind, courts should consider (1) “whether the tainted evidence itself added 
weight to the government’s case,” (2) “whether the evidence added weight to other 
evidence properly before the jury,” and (3) “whether the resulting increase in the weight 
of the state’s case moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion 
beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant’s guilt.”  
413 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate 
Activism,” 1362; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-60. 
414 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring); ibid., 292 (White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).  
415 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280; erroneous reasonable doubt instruction; Neder, 527 U.S. at 
7; omitted element of “materiality.” 
416 Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1362.  
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juxtapositions demonstrate how Chapman – and not Harrington – both protects 
constitutional rights and promotes the harmless error doctrine’s focus on “insignificant 
errors.”417 The Chapman test also ensures fundamental fairness by allowing the 
defendant to argue the protective purposes of the constitutional right infringed, preserving 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury assessment of guilt without the taint of a 
constitutional error, and preserving public respect for the system by foreclosing reversals 
for insignificant mistakes or technicalities.418 
But proponents of the rights-based approach argue that the Chapman Court “lost 
sight of [the harmless error statute and rule] and should have used them to ground its 
harmless error [analysis].”419 Their approach quite logically begins at the roots, with the 
texts of the Constitution and harmless error statute, rather than Court interpretations. 
First, the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that the founders believed to be so 
fundamental to enshrine in them perpetuity, to protect against majoritarian control and 
government tyranny.420 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments outline 
                                                          
417 Ibid.; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1206; the focus remains on the error’s impact 
rather than on all of the evidence except the error. 
418 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1209; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate 
Activism,” 1364-69. 
419 Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 42; see also Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 
535-40; noting that § 2111 and Rule 52(a) apply to both constitutional and non-
constitutional errors; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 116; the Court should “jettison 
Chapman in favor of a simplified, unitary, and transcontextual … test – reconceived as an 
elaboration of 28 U.S.C. § 2111 ….”  
420 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533; “Because of our historical experiences, our 
inherent distrust of government, and our anti-majoritarianism concerns, our legal system 
places a high value upon individual rights and liberties. Any test of harmless error should 
reflect these values;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 81; 
“[T]he Court’s harmless error decisions rest on a premise that ignores the purposes of 
many fundamental constitutional protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.” 
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“the minimal parameters” for the fair jury trial that is required by Article 3, § 2.421 These 
amendments also extend beyond individual protections for the defendant to larger 
societal and institutional concerns underlying our democracy,422 such as participation of 
the community through the jury system and assurance of public confidence in the 
legitimacy of our laws and judicial processes.423 
Second, for appellate review, Congress created a harmless error statute hinged to 
protecting “substantial rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111 provides: “On the hearing of any appeal 
or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the 
record, without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”424 Proponents of the statute-based test argue that the focus should be on these 
rights and the effect of their violation on the accused.425 While some scholars and judges 
disagree that this statute provides the basis for review of constitutional errors,426 the plain 
                                                          
421 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 510; While Chapel includes the Eighth 
Amendment, that amendment lies beyond the scope of this thesis. See U.S. Const. art. 3, 
§ 2; “The Trial of all Crimes … shall be by Jury.” 
422 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2051-60; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming 
Appellate Activism,” 1355-57; Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 536-39; Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1812-22; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1195-98; Epps, 
“Harmless Errors,” 2178-80.  
423 Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2054-60; Amar, America’s Constitution, 
237, 239, 229-30; Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 1355-57. 
424 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018); stating: “Any error, 
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be 
disregarded.” 
425 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 533-3; Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 42. 
426 Some scholars argue that harmless constitutional error is not statutory, but a form of 
“constitutional common law.” For example, Meltzer says that if § 2111 was meant to 
make conviction reversals harder, Chapman would not have imposed a more demanding 
reversal standard for constitutional errors. Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 20-26. 
But this point ignores that § 2111 aimed only to preclude reversals based on insignificant 
technicalities and minutia. Similarly, Epps asserts that “the Court’s observation in 
Chapman that its need to ‘fashion[] the necessary rule’ arose ‘in the absence of 
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language of its text does not distinguish between constitutional and non-constitutional 
violations.427 Instead, Congress chose the words “substantial rights.”428 Most scholars 
and judges would agree, however, that, as a theoretical matter, a constitutional right is a 
                                                          
appropriate congressional action’ provides a strong clue that the Court thought it was 
doing something more legislative than … constitutional interpretation.” Epps, “Harmless 
Errors,” 2150. But Epp’s reverse-juxtaposition of these quotations appears to distort the 
Court’s meaning. The Court actually stated: “We have no hesitation in saying that the 
right … – expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself – is a federal right which, in 
the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by 
fashioning the necessary rule.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. The Court in Chapman also 
cited § 2111 and Rule 52(a). See infra n. 427. Later justices and scholars have claimed, 
however, that harmless constitutional error is not statutorily-based, but, rather, based on 
yet a third option: the Constitution’s requirement of due process. See, e.g., United States 
v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 460 (1986); Justices Brennan and Blackman, concurring and 
dissenting, stating that “constitutional errors are governed by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than by § 2111 or Rule 52(a);” Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 424, n. 31; describing Chapman’s rule as a “constitutional 
judgment”. 
427 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22; “[T]he United States long ago through its Congress 
established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for ‘errors or 
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 2111. None 
of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of 
state law or federal statutes and rules;” Lane, 474 U.S. at 445; majority noting that § 2111 
does not distinguish error types, but instead rests on substantial rights; Gonzales-Lopez, 
548 U.S. at 157; Justice Alito arguing, in dissent, that Rule 52(a) applies to all 
constitutional errors. See Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 57; “Since Section 2111 
does not distinguish constitutional violations from other errors, it apparently governs 
them also ….”; accord Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534; Greabe, “Riddle 
Revisited,” 119.  
428 Congress rejected a Harrington-like, “correct result was reached” approach in 1919 
and, instead, focused on the error and its effect on substantial rights. Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64; Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2128; citing Act of Feb. 
26, ch, 48, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 892, 992. A text should be interpreted only within the range of “textually 
permissible meanings,” choosing an interpretation that “would serve, rather than 
frustrate, [its] manifest purpose,” and without supplementing it, as the text’s “limitations 
… are as much a part of its ‘purpose’ as its affirmative dispositions.” Scalia and Garner, 
Reading the Law, 57, 174-79. 
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substantial right429 and, as a threshold matter, an error must occur before the harmless 
error statute applies.430 Thus, giving effect to the words Congress used,431 the harmless 
error statute appears largely to turn on what the nouns “error or defect” and the verb 
“affects” mean when assessing whether an “error or defect” “affects substantial 
rights.”432 In United States v. Olano, the Court explained that “defect” is synonymous 
with “error,”433 which it defined as “[d]eviation from a legal rule” that has not been 
knowingly and voluntarily waived.434 The verb “affects” subscribes to the broad 
definition of “to influence in some way,”435 and it has been interpreted liberally in the 
                                                          
429 See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2151; “There is something unquestionably troubling 
about providing no remedy whatsoever for a recognized violation of a right important 
enough to be enumerated in our nation’s founding charter ….” But see Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 22; “[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular 
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal 
Constitution, be deemed harmless.” (Emphasis supplied). 
430 If no constitutional “error or defect” exists, then there is no “object” for harmless error 
assessment. See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; “application of [the] doctrine … 
presupposes the existence of … an error.” But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63; 
incorporating harm analysis as a component of defining the right. 
431 “In construing a statute, [the Court is] obliged to give effect, if possible, to every 
word” and should not interpret the statute in a way that would render “evasion under the 
law … almost certain.” Scalia and Garner, Reading the Law, 63-64, 174-79. 
432 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018).  
433 Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33; “the phrase ‘error or defect’ is more simply read as 
‘error.’”  
434 Ibid. The Court contrasted forfeiture: “whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right.’” Ibid. 
435 “Affect vb. (15c) 1. Most generally, to produce an effect on; to influence in some 
way.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), accessed March 29, 2019, 
www.westlaw.com.   
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less-demanding civil context.436 Yet, the harmless error statute also requires “an 
examination of the record.”437 Thus, the context in which the error occurs also matters.438 
Scholars of the right-based, § 2111 approach delineate categories for determining 
whether, in the context of the trial, an error affects the accused’s substantial rights.439 The 
first two categories are easy. First, “if in no event could the error be considered as not 
having a significant adverse effect,” then the court should summarily reverse and order a 
new trial.440 Examples, such as complete denial of the right to jury trial, to testify, to 
assistance of counsel, and to an impartial judge, sound very much like the “structural” 
errors noted by the Court in Fulminante.441 Second, if “the error can in no event rise 
above insignificant error,” then the court should summarily affirm the conviction.442 
Examples include quintessential harmless errors of mere technicality, etiquette, and 
formality, such as an omitted word or date or shackling the defendant when the jury 
cannot see it.443 The third category proves most problematic, however, as it captures 
those errors with a “high risk of affecting rights.”444 In this setting, the rights-based 
                                                          
436 “[A]ffects doctrine (1996) Constitutional law. The principle allowing Congress, under 
the Commerce Clause, to regulate intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. • The doctrine is so called because the test is whether a given 
activity ‘affects’ interstate commerce.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), accessed 
March 29, 2019, www.westlaw.com. 
437 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018).  
438 See supra n. 429; see also Scalia and Garner, Reading the Law, 33; “This critical word 
context embraces not just textual purpose but also … a word's immediate syntactic 
setting—that is, the words that surround it in a specific utterance.” (Emphasis original). 
439 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534-40. 
440 Ibid., 534. 
441 Ibid., 535-36; see also supra Chapter 3, Pt. D. & accompanying text. 
442 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 534. 
443 Ibid., 536-37. 
444 Ibid., 537. 
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approach directs (1) identification of the right involved and its purpose, (2) consideration 
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the error, and (3) assessment of whether 
failure to enforce the right would impair the deterrence effect against wrongful 
government conduct.445 Proponents of this approach appear to lean toward reversal when 
government misconduct is knowing or intentional, when failure to reverse will encourage 
future violations, or when a right promoting a significant societal value, such as 
nondiscrimination, is impacted.446 Closer calls, such as introduction of a defendant’s 
prior criminal activity447 or an error in jury instructions, hinge to how significant an 
impact the error likely had on the jury.448 Again, the assessment is of the actual jury, not 
a future hypothetical one,449 but the proponents of this test submit that it will not result in 
more reversals than the Chapman test would.450  
                                                          
445 Ibid., 534. Compare supra Chapter 3, nn. 249-52 & accompanying text; the Court has 
discerned three viable purposes that can render an error harmful per se: (1) the error 
causes unfairness “either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive 
undermining of the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial process;” (2) the 
“effect of the error is too difficult to measure or ascertain;” or (3) the “right at issue is not 
designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some 
other interest.” 
446 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 537-40.  
447 These scholars draw no distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
violations and eschew categorization of constitutional violations as either structural or 
trial errors. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 535, Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 
42, 48-49; Greabe, “Riddle Revisited,” 119. 
448 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 537-40. E.g., introduction of a speeding ticket 
pales by comparison to introduction of a ten-year-old manslaughter conviction in a 
murder trial, and a jury instruction that is beneficial to the defendant, or merely 
duplicative, differs in impact from one that omits or misstates an element. Ibid. 
449 Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 22; “The crucial question is not what might 
happen tomorrow on an edited rerun, but what did happen yesterday on the actual run.” 
450 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 539; see Traynor, Riddle of Harmless Error, 42-
51; Greabe, 116-19, both arguing that this test would employ a “highly probable” (or 
“clear and convincing evidence”) standard, whereas Chapman mandates a “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” (or “almost certain”) standard. 
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B. Remedy-Based Approach versus Violation-Based Approach 
A majority of scholars argue that harmless error review is remedy-based and 
designed to assess what action, if any, is needed to redress an acknowledged 
constitutional violation.451 A minority view posits, instead, that the “harm” inquiry is 
really an element in determining whether a constitutional violation occurred at all.452 
Recent work in these areas highlight the differences between the two positions as well as 
the nuances within each one.453 While neither view is perfect, the remedy-based approach 
and its recognition of a constitutional violation seems sounder than an approach that 
defines the scope of the constitutional right based on whether harm occurred. 
The remedy-based approach promoted both recently and by past scholars first 
must be distinguished from the result-driven approach of Harrington. While Harrington 
largely ignores the constitutional error in search of other record evidence of guilt, the 
remedy-based approach contextually asks “not just whether an error contributed to the 
outcome, but also the implications of an error on the broader ‘constellation of interests’ 
served” by the constitutional rule.”454 
                                                          
451 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793; harmless error review is “a set of 
closely related remedial rules;” Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 91; harmless error is a “remedial rule,” Meltzer, “Constitutional Remedies,” 17; 
“harmless error is best viewed as a question of remedies.” 
452 See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2121. 
453 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” (2017); Epps, “Harmless Errors,” (2018); 
Brandon L. Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” Harvard Law Review Forum 130, no. 7 (2017); 
responding to Murray; John M. Greabe, “Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: 
A Response to Professor Epps,” Columbia Law Review Online 118, no. 6 (2018), 
https://columbialawreview.org/content/criminal-procedure-rights-and-harmless-error-a-
response-to-professor-epps/. 
454 Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” 288; quoting Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1811. 
See also Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98; ibid, 94; 
the criminal process possesses a broad array of “non-truth-furthering” values. Murray 
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This constellation of interests includes not only “truth-furthering” functions, but 
also “non-truth-furthering” ones.455 And many rights have “mixed purposes,”456 both to 
foster the “truth-furthering” interest in the reliability of the outcome457 and promote 
“non-truth-furthering” interests that extend beyond a particular defendant’s concerns. The 
Fourth Amendment protects the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures,458 and guards an individual’s privacy interest, deters abusive police conduct 
violating this right, and results in exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial.459 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits charges without indictment by a grand jury based on 
probable cause, being placed in jeopardy for the same offense twice, being compelled to 
incriminate one’s self, and deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process.460 
This provision of due process is furthered by the Fourteenth Amendment, which adds the 
right to equal protection to prevent prejudice and discrimination.461 And the Sixth 
Amendment elaborates on trial rights, namely to know the nature and cause of the 
                                                          
notes that Judge Chapel’s proposal is not incompatible with a contextual, value-based 
approach, as it also asks “‘whether any error had a significant effect upon a right of the 
accused’” and would answer that question based, in part, on the “‘purpose’” of the 
infringed rule. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1797, n. 31; quoting Chapel, “Irony of 
Harmless Error,” 534.  
455 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810-20; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-98. Writing twenty years after Stacy and Dayton, 
Murray notes that his and their views regarding redressability for non-truth-furthering 
interests do not always coalesce. Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1813, n. 126. 
456 See Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 89; Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1812.  
457 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
458 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
459 See Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812; Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1197-98; 
Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2178-80. 
460 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
461 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
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criminal charge pressed, to confront and compel witnesses and have assistance of counsel 
in presenting a defense, and to a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury.462 
Larger interests linked to individual dignity and autonomy as well as community 
participation, oversight, and confidence in the judicial system inform many of these 
amendments. Proponents of the remedy-based, contextual approach urge that when a 
constitutional error triggers concerns about “non-truth-furthering” interests, courts must 
carefully scrutinize the impact on those interests in fashioning the appropriate remedy.463 
The exact test to be applied as articulated by these scholars differs in some 
respects, although their analytical outcomes appear to be similar. Some scholars posit that 
the court should consider: (1) “whether the violation has impaired … the constitutional 
right in question;” (2) “whether redoing the adjudicative process can … cure the harm 
caused by the violation;” and (3) whether “reversal [may be] necessary to deter future 
violations.”464 A more recent iteration states that the court should: (1) “begin by 
                                                          
462 U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
463 See, e.g., Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 93-98; 
advocating reversal, for instance, for denial of the right to self-representation because it 
implicates dignitary and autonomy concerns; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1810-
20; adding, as an example, violation of the right against self-incrimination “out of 
‘respect for the inviolability of the human personality.’” Ibid. 1812 (citation omitted). 
These authors also list in the “non-truth-furthering” category the right to a jury and right 
against discrimination because of the societal concerns associated with community 
participation and fair play. Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional 
Error,” 110-13; Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1812-13.  
464 Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 91-92. As examples, 
violation of the right to confrontation might not require a redo, provided the excluded 
evidence was proffered into the record, whereas violation of the right to counsel would 
require a redo because the record lacks counsel’s input. Ibid., 93. By contrast, while 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence might have but a minimal effect when 
considering the entire record, a redo might be desired to deter future violations. Ibid., 95-
96. And, when the violation is one likely to escape detection, such as withholding 
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identifying the interest (or range of interests) protected” by the right; and (2) “conduct 
contextual harmless error review … [so that the] remedies … correspond” to protecting 
those interests.465 This latter test would also, however, take deterrence into account when 
the right involved implicates that concern.466 Ultimately, the goal of the tests is “to 
address the serious concern that ‘nearly ubiquitous use of a harmless error rule focusing 
on the outcome of the trial … denigrates important constitutional protections … that 
promote values other than the reliability of verdicts.”467 Reversal and a new trial, perhaps 
even sanctions, may be required to vindicate these “non-truth-furthering” protections.468 
                                                          
exculpatory evidence or offering perjured testimony, reversal and redo are necessary to 
eliminate future incentives to commit the same wrongdoing. Ibid., 95-98. 
465 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1795. Murray further cabins these interests into 
two sub-categories: result-correlated interests and result-independent interests. Ibid., 
1814-20. Result-correlated interests, such as the Fourth Amendment’s interests in 
protecting privacy and deterring future violations, will negatively impact the truth- and 
non-truth-furthering functions similarly, depending on the extent to which the illegally-
introduced evidence enhanced conviction chances. Ibid., 1815-16. By contrast, result-
independent interests, such as discrimination in jury selection, which creates bias in the 
proceeding and erodes public confidence, do not necessarily align with the truth-seeking 
interests or, if they do, only coincidentally. Looking purely at the case outcome, 
therefore, will not vindicate these interests. Ibid., 1817-18. 
466 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1820-23; citing a “prototypical” case involving 
failure of a judge to recuse where there appeared to be a conflict of interest or bias. 
Noting that the purpose of the rule “‘is to promote confidence in the judiciary by 
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety,’” on harmless error review, the Court 
considered three factors, only the first of which related solely to the “truth-seeking” 
interest: (1) “the risk of injustice” to the parties in the case; (2) “the risk that the denial of 
relief will produce injustice in other cases;” and (3) “the risk of undermining the public’s 
confidence in the judicial process.” Ibid., 1821 (citation omitted). The second prong 
focused on “deterring future infractions” and the third prong focused on “shoring up 
judicial legitimacy,” both of which are “non-truth-furthering” interests. Ibid., 1822. 
467 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1799; quoting Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80-81. As noted, Murray’s and Stacy and Dayton’s 
arguments and goals are similar. 
468 Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,” 95-98; Murray, “A 
Contextual Approach,” 1813, 1818-20. But see Garrett, “Patterns of Error,” 288, 293-95; 
responding to Murray, inter alia, that his contextual approach likely will confer more 
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By contrast, the recently-espoused, violation-based approach would fold the harm 
inquiry into the assessment of whether any constitutional violation occurred at all.469 This 
premise essentially conflates the error with whether it resulted in any harm, “inexorably”  
tying harmful- or harmless-ness with the process of defining the right.470 As a result, 
harmless error no longer serves as a remedial review standard, but, instead, becomes part 
of the substantive nature of the right itself.471 
As a preliminary matter, for scholars who view the harmless error statute as 
applicable to constitutional errors, the violation-based theory is a non-starter.472 It makes 
harmless error analysis part of determining whether an error occurred, but, under the 
statute, an error must exist, first, for harmless error review to apply.473 Next, the proposal 
renders the meaning of constitutional rights nebulous by tying their meaning to the 
peculiar facts of each individual case. It therefore offers no guidance to American 
                                                          
discretion on judges to rely on their cognitive biases and personal value judgments. 
“Telling judges to broaden their focus is unlikely to help,” Garrett says. Ibid., 295. 
469 Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2158-63. 
470 Ibid., 2121-22; the appellate court “is really asking whether a defendant’s 
constitutional rights have been violated at all.” 
471 See Ibid., 2163; “[I]f one understands harmless error as part and parcel of 
constitutional rights, and not as part of the law of remedies, the mystery vanishes.” And 
see Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 119, 121; noting that under Epps’s proposal, harmless 
error would no longer be a remedial doctrine. 
472 See supra n. 426 & accompanying text. But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2144; The 
Supreme Court’s harmless error “‘cases are not about figuring out what Congress meant, 
in 1919, by “affect the substantial rights of the parties.”’” (Citation omitted). 
473 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018); stating in pertinent part: “On the hearing of any appeal …, 
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record, without regard to errors 
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights.” (Emphasis supplied). See also Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018); stating: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does 
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” (Emphasis supplied). In my view, both 
the statute and the rule assume an error has occurred. But see Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 
2165; arguing that, rather than providing a remedial review standard, the statute simply 
“command[s] against overenforcing rights.” (Emphasis original). 
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citizens, who have a fundamental right to rely on the Constitution’s protections before 
they act, and it strips the right of any objectively identifiable meaning, effectively 
rendering the right valueless. In addition, trial judges, who must decide in the midst of 
proceedings, before the record is fully developed, whether a constitutional violation has 
or is about to occur, have no direction if the right’s meaning is yet-to-be-determined by 
an appellate court, on review of the particular case.474 This dynamic also creates a 
disconnect between what rights mean at the trial court and appellate court levels. The 
proponent of the violation-based test implicitly acknowledges this weakness by urging 
trial courts to act more stringently when faced with a potential constitutional violation.475 
But, as a responsive scholar has questioned, "if trial courts should [take such action], why 
should appellate courts more narrowly define the scope of the relevant right?”476 
Finally, the violation-based test begs the question of what constitutes sufficient 
harm to require reversal by merely moving the harm assessment to a different place. Any 
analogy to those few constitutional issues that do incorporate harm into the analysis of 
assessing a violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence,477 are distinguishable. “Neither … right is enumerated in the 
Constitution and neither right is typically capable of being asserted … and vindicated in 
                                                          
474 Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 124-26. 
475  Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2171. 
476  Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 125. Paradoxically, the proponent simultaneously 
argues that the violation-based approach “would require courts to be clearer about the 
values at stake.” Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2186. 
477 See Epps, “Harmless Errors,” 2160, arguing for extension of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 
(ineffective assistance of counsel) and Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (failure to disclose exculpatory 
or impeaching evidence). Both tests embed the prejudice requirement into the elements of 
proving the violation. 
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real time …, before a violation occurs.”478 In addition, the violation-based test runs the 
risk of diluting constitutional rights by making the harm assessment determinative of 
whether the right, as articulated in the Bill of Rights, even exists and, if so, to what 
extent.479 It easily could result in courts defining constitutional rights narrowly in their 
assessment of whether harm occurred in the context of a particular case.480 
                                                          
478 Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 126. See also Ibid., 123, quoting Epps, “Harmless 
Errors,” 2170, who concedes that, outside of Strickland and Brady, the Supreme Court 
has rejected the suggestion to treat harm as part of the determination of whether a 
violation occurred in other constitutional contexts. 
479 Ibid., 125. 
480 Compare Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1182; noting, based on his experience as a 
judge, that an automatic-reversal rule would encourage courts to define constitutional 
rights more narrowly. Here, the same could occur as appellate courts define “rights” as 
part of a “violation” determination that incorporates “harm” in the context of particular 
case facts. The global impact of those holdings might potentially narrow constitutional 
protections across-the-board. See also Greabe, “A Response to Epps,” 126. Ibid.; noting 
that Strickland and Brady have come under “criticism for being insufficiently protective 
of the rights of criminal defendants.” 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 At bottom, a Constitution that is by and for the People means that constitutional 
rights should reflect what society deems to be acceptable, which is why the jury role is so 
important.481 The government does not confer rights and liberties. It exists only to protect 
and uphold them.482 And, yet, the prevailing harmless error doctrine allows courts and 
government officials to disregard constitutional rights, effectively neutering violations 
and eviscerating constitutional principles.483 As the prior discussions show, no readily-
available solution is in sight. Scholars agree that harmless error has exceeded its original 
purposes but cannot agree about how to fix it.484 As demonstrated by numerous close 
cases from the Supreme Court, the justices also are divided.485 The harmless 
constitutional error doctrine has become a legal quagmire of indeterminacy, malleability, 
and unpredictability. 
 A correction from the Supreme Court or from Congress is long overdue. 
Enforcement of constitutional rights should not be “exceedingly rare.”486 Control over 
life and liberty by appellate judges using a doctrine designed to promote economy, 
                                                          
481 See supra Chapter 4, Pt. A. 
482 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 509. 
483 See supra Chapter 3. 
484 See supra Chapter 5. 
485 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279; where the Court splintered in several directions 
concerning whether coerced confessions can be harmless; Neder, 527 U.S. 1; where the 
Court divided six-three concerning whether omission of a criminal element from jury 
instructions can be harmless; Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140; where a five-four vote 
determined whether denial of counsel can be harmless; Williams, 136 S.Ct. 1899; where a 
six-three split addressed failure of a judge to recuse; McCoy, 138 S.Ct. 1500; where a six-
three vote addressed deprivation of defendant’s autonomy to decide whether to admit 
guilt or maintain innocence. 
486 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793. 
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finality, and pragmatism487 is precisely what the founders sought to prevent by installing 
permanent protections in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.488  
This disassociation of constitutional violations from judicial remedies also 
contradicts the harmless error statute’s terms and breaches the Court’s obligation to adopt 
remedies that safeguard constitutional rights.489 The statutory terms allow a finding of 
“harmlessness” only when the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.490 
The Court in Chapman wrongly shifted the focus away from the error’s effect on rights to 
the error’s effect on the verdict.491 Later, in Harrington, it egregiously shifted the focus 
away from even the error, to a review of other, untainted record evidence.492 Justice 
                                                          
487 See supra Chapter 4, Pts. A & C. 
488 See supra Chapter 2. 
489  Garrett, “Innocence, Harmless Error,” 57, n. 104; see Murray, “A Contextual 
Approach,” 1794; the harmless error rule is the “leading contributor to the expansive gap 
between rights and remedies in criminal procedure;” Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 5-
6; harmless error “has the capacity to permanently sever rights from remedies;” Epps, 
“Harmless Errors,” 2151; “there is … something troubling about providing no remedy … 
for a … violation of a right important enough to be enumerated in our nation’s 
[Constitution].” It is worth emphasizing, at this point, that the Supreme Court has an 
obligation to preserve and protect constitutional rights. Chapel, “Irony of Harmless 
Error,” 510, 517. 
490 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (2018). 
491 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 506-07; claiming the error’s effect on the verdict 
is irrelevant under the statute’s terms, and the court has “rewritten the statute through 
judicial interpretation.” Ibid., 530-31. 
492 Ibid.; asserting other record evidence of guilt simply is not part of the statutory test. 
Explanations for this change in approach go beyond mere changes in the Court’s 
membership. Chief Judge Edwards notes the coincidence of the “overwhelming” 
evidence test with the significant increase in crime and judicial dockets in the United 
States in the 1960s. The number of appeals virtually tripled during the Burger and 
Rehnquist Court eras. Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1191 & n. 103. As Goldberg 
complains, however, “if society … has been damaged by the change in the relationship 
between the individual and the state as incarcerator, that is a matter to be addressed on 
the merits, not through the procedural backdoor of harmless error review.” Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 432. 
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Benjamin Cardozo “long ago noted ‘[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the 
limit of its logic.’”493 It is time for a history lesson on why the harmless error doctrine 
exists and a constitutional lesson on why it cannot be used to subordinate constitutional 
protections.494  
Numerous articles and studies have documented the Court’s slide down the 
slippery slope, shifting from greater recognition of inviolate constitutional rights, to a 
focus on the impact of the constitutional violation on the verdict, and, finally, to review 
of the untainted record evidence, apart from the constitutional error, in search of 
“overwhelming evidence” of guilt.495 Prevailing harmless error review today thus 
                                                          
493 Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1173; quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921): 51. See also Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 426; “Any new doctrine or exception to an established 
doctrine must be expected to grow past the parameters set in the decision which created 
it.” 
494 I realize, and accept, that the result likely will be that more constitutional violations 
result in reversal. As emphasized previously, however, reversal does not result in 
acquittal. It results in a new and fair trial, which is not too large a sacrifice for our society 
to make when considering that an individual’s life and liberty are at risk and larger 
societal protections against government control, even abuse, are at issue. See supra 
Chapter 4, Pt. C. 
495 Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1793, n. 10; recounting numerous studies. See 
Landes and Posner, “Harmless Error,” 182–84; reviewing federal appellate criminal 
decisions that considered harmless error between 1996 and 1998 and finding, “[i]n 87 
percent of the cases, the errors were held to be harmless,” ibid., 184; Solomon, “Causing 
Constitutional Harm,” 1065–67, 1067 n.64; reviewing published federal appellate habeas 
corpus decisions that conducted harmless error review between 1993 and 2004 and 
finding errors harmless in “nearly two out of three analyses,” ibid., 1067; Goldberg, 
“Constitutional Sneak Thief,” 421; estimating, based on citations to the 1967 Chapman 
decision, that, as of 1980, harmless error had “determined as many cases as almost any 
precedent,” ibid., n. 2; but see Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1180–81 & nn. 50, 52; 
reviewing published federal appellate decisions (including civil cases) and finding that 
about 2% mentioned “harmless error” between 1969 and 1985 and about 1.58% 
mentioned it between 1986 and 1994, whereas about 0.79% mentioned it pre-Chapman. 
Review of harmless error at the state level also revealed significant, impactful influence 
on appellate judgments. See Kamin, “Rights/Remedies Split,” 62–72; reviewing one 
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involves appellate courts weighing the evidence for factual guilt, rather than legally 
determining whether the government proved that the error could not have affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights.496 The warning given after the harmless error doctrine’s 
creation has now become a reality: the “judicial pendulum” has swung “to presuming all 
errors to be 'harmless'” when appellate courts believe that the defendant complaining of 
the constitutional violation is, in fact, guilty. But, “[i]n view of the place of importance 
that trial by jury has in our Bill of Rights,” harmless error review should not “substitute 
the belief of appellate judges in the guilt of an accused, however, justifiably engendered 
by the dead record, for ascertainment of guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial 
guidance, however cumbersome that process may be.”497 The harmless error doctrine’s 
                                                          
state’s death penalty decisions between 1976 and 1996 and finding that, during this 
period, “the reversal rate … dropped from 94% to 14%,” ibid., 62, and “differential use 
of the harmless error doctrine” accounted for “nearly all of the difference in death penalty 
outcomes,” ibid., 63;  Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 504 n. 26; finding, based on 
review of one state court’s death penalty decisions in 1995 and 1996, that in 72% of the 
cases, “at least one claimed error was resolved by applying the harmless error rule;” 
Thomas Y. Davies, “Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making 
Norms in a California Court of Appeal,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal 7, 
no. 3 (1982); finding that in fiscal year 1974, criminal appellate dispositions in one state 
court reflected “at least one harmless error reference in approximately a quarter of all 
affirmed and modified appeals,” ibid, 604, and that “[i]ssues where . . . the harmless error 
rule . . . [was] likely to apply had very low success rates,” ibid., 617.  
496 See Edwards, “To Err is Human,” 1171-72; “I believe that, more often than not, we 
[judges] review the record to determine how we might have decided the case; the 
judgment as to whether an error is harmless is therefore dependent on our judgment about 
factual guilt of the defendant.” Mitchell, “Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism,” 
1361; while Chapman focuses on the nature and context of the error, Harrington directs 
attention away from the error to the rest of the evidence; Stacy and Dayton, “Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error,” 80; the Court has extend[ed] its preoccupation with 
factual guilt beyond rhetoric.” 
497 Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15. (Emphasis supplied). See also Kotteakos, 320 U.S. at 
760; “our government is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, 
with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic [sic] individual protections, 
including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or 
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interests of pragmatism, efficiency, and finality have, impermissibly, allowed courts to 
invade the role of the jury and erode fundamental individual rights and institutional 
democratic protections.498  
The courts’ continued use of the harmless error doctrine also allows, even 
encourages, unlawfulness and abuse by the very governmental branches charged with 
enforcing the law.499 The Constitution’s protections against governmental abuse and 
majoritarian rule, and its protections of the larger values enshrined within constitutional 
rights, are placed in jeopardy, as a result. The courts should, instead, seek to uphold the 
law and Constitution and deter government officials from violating them. As Justice 
Brandeis stated in dissent to a case that the Court later overturned,500 the Constitution 
limits the power and authority of federal actors and precludes them from taking 
advantage of constitutional violations, even to obtain convictions.501 The courts, in turn, 
                                                          
complacent ….;” Bihn, 328 U.S at 638-39; “[n]or is it enough for us to conclude that guilt 
may be deduced from the whole record. Such a course would lead to serious intrusions on 
the historic [sic] functions of the jury under our system of government;” Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 22; rejecting an “overwhelming evidence” of guilt test and stating that the purpose 
of the harmless error doctrine is “to block setting aside convictions for small errors or 
defects.” Compare Murray, “A Contextual Approach,” 1803, n. 64, and Epps, “Harmless 
Errors,” 2128; both noting that Congress rejected a “correct result was reached” approach 
and, instead, focused on whether the error affected substantial rights when creating the 
harmless error statute. 
498 Fairfax, “A Fair Trial,” 455-56; Fairfax, “Harmless Constitutional Error,” 2027, 2060-
65. 
499 Chapel, “Irony of Harmless Error,” 515-16; See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 470; “Courts themselves are instruments of law enforcement.” 
500 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 482, 48 S.Ct. 564, 574, 72 L. Ed. 944 
(1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 
2d 1040 (1967), and overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 
507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). 
501 Ibid., 484; “The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as his most virtuous 
fellow citizen.”  
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must deny federal actors the benefit of their violations in order to protect and promote 
constitutional values, respect for the law, and public confidence in the justice system:502 
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials 
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration 
of the criminal law the end justifies the means – to declare that the 
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a 
private criminal – would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious 
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.503 
But the courts have not always done so, as illustrated by the “hypothetical” 
outlined in Chapter 1, which is a slightly-altered version of a real case, as well as 
numerous other cases.504 Kirk Defendant is actually Karl Fontenot, the well-publicized 
                                                          
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid., 485. (Emphasis supplied). See also Bilaisis, “Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct,” 457; “Society and the courts have a significant interest in promoting 
confidence in the administration of justice, and in preserving the judicial process from 
contamination by courses of action found illegal or deemed unfair.” 
504 See e.g., Kozinski, “Criminal Law 2.0,” xi, xxiv-xxv; citing the 2013 release of a 
death row inmate convicted based on a supposed oral confession that was fabricated by 
Detective Saldate, “a serial liar,” and the prosecution’s withholding, for decades, of 
exculpatory Brady evidence; ibid., xxvi; another case involving a serial jailhouse snitch 
that the prosecutor knew to be a liar, but routinely placed near target defendants’ jail cells 
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subject of books, articles, and television series that dub him “the innocent man.”505 On 
appeal, the court affirmed Fontenot’s conviction.506 It rejected his challenge to his 
confession, despite his claims of coercion and the stark differences between his 
confession and the actual circumstances of the victim’s death. It refused his arguments 
that the police fed the suspects the same information for the confessions – information 
that turned out to be incorrect – or that Fontenot’s mental deficiencies or psychological 
state rendered his confession untrustworthy. Finally, the court approved of the detective’s 
testimony about the co-defendant’s confession during Fontenot’s trial, despite the earlier 
court order that the confession could not be used and was unreliable in regard to him.507  
Karl Fontenot has now been in prison for 35 years. The defendants in the second 
murder case, in which the same jailhouse informant falsely claimed the two men had 
confessed, have since been exonerated by DNA evidence.508 The parallels between the 
                                                          
anyway; ibid, xxvii; prosecution withheld the statements of seventeen witnesses, all of 
whom said they saw the victim alive after the defendant was arrested and incarcerated for 
murder. 
505 See John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town (New 
York: Random House, 2006): 430; condemning a system that condones “bad police work, 
junk science, faulty eyewitness identifications, bad defense lawyers, lazy prosecutors, 
[and] arrogant prosecutors;” Robert Mayer, The Dreams of Ada (New York: Broadway 
Books, 2006): jacket; recounting “the nightmare of a small town obsessed with delivering 
justice, and the bizarre dream of a poor, uneducated man accused of murder – a case that 
chillingly parallels [another] one, occurring in the very same town;” Nick Schager, “‘The 
Innocent Man’: Inside the Two Gruesome Murders Haunting a Small Oklahoma Town,” 
The Daily Beast, December 10, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-innocent-man-
inside-the-two-gruesome-murders-haunting-a-small-oklahoma-town; The Innocent Man, 
directed by Clay Tweel, (Los Gatos, CA: Netflix, Inc., 2018), television.  
506 Fontenot v. State of Oklahoma, 992 P.2d 69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). See Fontenot v. 
State of Oklahoma, 742 P.2d 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); giving additional facts. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Innocence Project, “Ron Williamson,” The Innocence Project, accessed February 13, 
2019, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/ron-williamson. Williamson and his co-
defendant, Dennis Fritz, were exonerated in 1999 after serving eleven years in prison for 
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two murder cases are too obvious to miss: both had “minimal physical evidence, the use 
of ‘dream’ confessions, [] reliance on testimony by [the same] jailhouse informant[], 
[and] … a similar cast of characters: Peterson was the prosecutor and Rogers was the 
investigator.”509 Unfortunately, for Fontenot and his co-defendant, DNA evidence no 
longer exists in their case. 
In early 2019, Fontenot’s counsel learned that voluminous, undisclosed police 
records exist that document the police investigations, interrogations, intimidation of 
witnesses, and interception of Fontenot’s attorney letters, as were noted in the case 
sketch.510 But, the records also contain many other, undisclosed witness statements 
saying that the victim had long been stalked by an unknown assailant; that Fontenot was 
not one of the men at the convenience store; and that Fontenot was at the party the entire 
                                                          
a crime they did not commit. Williamson was only five days away from execution when 
the court issued a stay. As the record demonstrates, the State fought the defendants’ 
attempts to prove their innocence at every turn. See Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991), order corrected by, 905 P.2d 1135 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992), rehearing denied, 504 U.S. 968 (1992). See also 
Williamson v. State, 852 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 
(1994). And see Williamson v. State, 904 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), affirmed, 110 
F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997). See Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), 
affirmed, 64 F.3d 338 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997). 
509 Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 726 (10th Cir. 2010). In this civil suit, State 
Prosecutor William Peterson, Police Officer Gary Rogers, and State forensic hair expert 
Melvin Hett sued the book authors for, inter alia, defamation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal of their suit. After noting that “[t]he books themselves are 
substantially true,” the district court “faced … th[e] basic question: What two words best 
describe a claim for money damages by government officials against authors and 
publishers of books describing purported prosecutorial misconduct? Answer: Not 
plausible.” Peterson v. Grisham, No. CIV-07-317-RAW, 2008 WL 4363653, at *1, *6 
(E.D.Ok., Sept. 17, 2008). 
510 See supra Chapter 1, pp. 4-6. 
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night of the crimes.511 Fontenot’s attorneys are, again, challenging his conviction. They 
have lodged claims of prosecutor and police misconduct, which include Brady 
nondisclosures, Fifth Amendment violations of the rights against self-incrimination and 
deprivation of due process, and Sixth Amendment violations of the rights to compel and 
confront witnesses and to assistance of counsel.512 Whether Fontenot’s claims succeed 
likely will depend on the importance the reviewing court places on constitutional rights 
and its interpretation of harmless constitutional error. It is this author’s hope that the 
dialogue will be something like one described by a judge who clearly places 
constitutional values and trial fairness above pragmatic harmless error concerns of 
efficiency and finality. That fine judge stated: 
While considering my decision in this case I told a friend, a layman, I 
believed the facts and law dictated that I must grant a new trial to a 
defendant who had been convicted and sentenced to death. 
My friend asked, “Is he a murderer?” 
I replied simply, “We won't know until he receives a fair trial.” 
God help us, if ever in this great country we turn our heads while people 
who have not had fair trials are executed. That almost happened in this 
case.513 
 
                                                          
511 See Fontenot v. Allbaugh, case number 6:16-cv-00069, doc. number 123 (E.D.Ok., 
March 19, 2019). 
512 Ibid.  
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